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ABSTRACT
Equatorial Guinea has, since the mid-1990s, been an oil-rich state. With the highest 
GDP per capita it  should be a continental leader in terms of development. Instead, it 
ranks in one of the worst positions on the United Nations Development Programme’s 
(UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI). This study employs the theory of neo-
patrimonialism to explain why such a discrepancy in these development indicators is 
evident. 
As a result of examining the post-independence regimes in Equatorial Guinea through 
the theoretical lens of neo-patrimonialism it is possible to conclude that the country is 
afflicted by a governance curse, rather than the more narrowly defined ‘resource 
curse’ that has become the central explanation of the situation in the country since the 
discovery  of oil favoured by  the existing literature on the subject. Instead, this study 
highlights the fact  that the neo-patrimonial nature of the regime in Equatorial Guinea 
has developed steadily over the years since independence was granted by Spain in 
1968, and indeed, the seeds of this system were in fact evident during Spanish 
colonial control. 
Whilst the existing literature has focused on the role of oil in explaining the dire state 
that Equatorial Guinea finds itself in, this study argues that there are other central 
factors that need to be examined. These include: the Spanish colonial legacy that  led 
the way for such a system to take root; the role of the first post-independence 
president, Macías Nguema (1968-1979) and; the regime of Obiang Nguema (1979-
present). By  looking at  these factors in addition to the role of oil it is possible to 
conclude that the neo-patrimonial system in place in Equatorial Guinea has much 
deeper roots than the existing literature acknowledges. It is vital to examine these 
deeper roots in order to discover an understanding of and effective solution to the 
current situation. Moreover, through examining the central features and operations of 
the ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regime in Equatorial Guinea, most  notably the 
profligate spending and evident capital flight, it is possible to acknowledge the 
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international nature of the problem: a factor that has heretofore been neglected in the 
literature. A greater focus on this issue is necessary  in order to understand why the 
regime is sustained and what prospects there can be for future regime change.
The outcomes of the study  suggest that a ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regime is the 
central explanation for how the political sphere operates in Equatorial Guinea. This 
means that there can be no distinction made between the central features of the state 
and the personal property  of those that rule it. It  is a classic, modern-day example of 
‘L’État c’est moi’. As such, the Nguema family have since independence treated the 
state resources as their own private property to do with as they wish. This means that 
there has been no attention paid to the development of Equatorial Guinea as it is not in 
the interests of the ruling elites to do so. Instead, they utilise state resources for their 
own self-enrichment. Such behaviour accounts for why  despite having the highest 
GDP per capita on the African continent, Equatorial Guinea has such a low rank in the 
UNDP Human Development Index. It can therefore be concluded that Equatorial 
Guinea is affected by a governance curse that has decimated the state since 
independence, rather than the popularised theory  of a ‘resource curse’ which has been 
used in explanations since the discovery of oil in the mid-1990s.
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OPSOMMING
 
Ekwatoriaal-Guinee is reeds sedert die middel negentigerjare ’n olieryke staat. Met 
die hoogste BBP per capita behoort dit die leier op die vasteland te wees wat 
ontwikkeling betref. Dit beklee egter een van die laagste plekke op die menslike 
ontwikkelingsindeks (HDI) van die Verenigde Nasies se Ontwikkelingsprogram 
(UNDP). In hierdie studie is die teorie van neopatrimonialisme gebruik in ’n poging 
om die teenstrydigheid in hierdie ontwikkelingsaanwysers te verklaar. 
Op grond van ’n ondersoek van die regimes ná onafhanklikheid in Ekwatoriaal-
Guinee deur die teoretiese lens van neopatrimonialisme kan die gevolgtrekking 
gemaak word dat die land onder ’n regeringsvloek gebuk gaan, eerder as die eng 
gedefinieerde ‘hulpbronvloek’ wat die vernaamste verklaring geword het vir die 
situasie in die land sedert die ontdekking van olie, soos in die huidige literatuur oor 
die onderwerp aangevoer word. Hierdie studie beklemtoon hierteenoor die feit dat die 
neopatrimoniale aard van die regime in Ekwatoriaal-Guinee met verloop van tyd 
ontwikkel het sedert Spanje die land in 1968 onafhanklik verklaar het. Die sade van 
hierdie stelsel was inderwaarheid reeds sigbaar tydens Spaanse koloniale beheer. 
Waar die bestaande literatuur fokus op die rol van olie in die verklaring van die 
nypende toestand waarin Ekwatoriaal-Guinee verkeer, word in hierdie studie 
aangevoer dat ander kernfaktore ook ondersoek moet word. Dit sluit in die Spaanse 
koloniale erfenis wat die weg gebaan het vir die groei van so ’n stelsel; die rol van die 
eerste president ná onafhanklikwording, Macías Nguema (1968–1979); en die regime 
van Obiang Nguema (1979 – tans). Deur hierdie faktore tesame met die rol van olie in 
oorweging te bring, kan die gevolgtrekking gemaak word dat die neopatrimoniale 
stelsel in Ekwatoriaal-Guinee veel dieper wortels het as wat in die bestaande literatuur 
erken word. Die ondersoek van hierdie dieper wortels is noodsaaklik ten einde begrip 
van en doeltreffende oplossings vir die huidige situasie te verkry. Deur die ondersoek 
van die kernfaktore en -bedrywighede van die ‘roofsugtige’ neopatrimoniale regime in 
Ekwatoriaal-Guinee, vernaamlik die roekelose verkwistinge en sigbare 
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kapitaaluitvloei, is dit  moontlik om die internasionale aard van die probleem te 
identifiseer – ’n faktor wat tot op hede in die literatuur nagelaat is. Groter fokus op 
hierdie kwessie is nodig ten einde te begryp waarom die regime volgehou word en 
watter vooruitsigte daar is vir toekomstige regimeverandering.
Die uitkomste van hierdie studie doen aan die hand dat ’n ‘roofsugtige’ 
neopatrimoniale regime inderwaarheid die vernaamste verklaring is vir die werking 
van die politieke sfeer in Ekwatoriaal-Guinee. Dit beteken dat geen onderskeid getref 
kan word tussen die kerneienskappe van die staat  en die persoonlike eiendom van 
diegene in bewind nie. Dit is ’n klassieke, hedendaagse voorbeeld van ‘L’État c’est 
moi’. As sodanig hanteer die Nguema-familie sedert onafhanklikwording die staat se 
hulpbronne as hul eie private eiendom wat hulle na willekeur aanwend. Dit beteken 
dat geen aandag gegee word aan die ontwikkeling van Ekwatoriaal-Guinee nie, 
aangesien dit nie in die belange van die heersende elite is om dit te doen nie, en hulle 
staatshulpbronne vir selfverryking gebruik. Sodanige gedrag verklaar die land se lae 
posisie op  die UNDP se HDI. Die gevolgtrekking kan dus gemaak word dat 
Ekwatoriaal-Guinee onder ’n staatsvloek ly, wat die staat sedert  onafhanklikwording 
afmaai, eerder as die gewilde teorie van ’n ‘hulpbronvloek’.
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A NOTE ON THE TEXT
Whilst carrying out the research for this study it was found that a variety  of spellings 
have been used, depending on whether the traditional Spanish or an anglicised version 
has been chosen. For the most part the true Spanish spelling has been adopted in this 
study, unless the anglicised version was found to be the most common. Moreover, due 
to the colonial and post-colonial history in Equatorial Guinea, place names have 
changed over time. As such the study attempts to use the correct place name for the 
specific period, and indicates if it has since or previously been known as something 
else. The exception throughout however, is in relation to quoted text; in which case 
the author’s original spelling/name has been replicated.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Oil kindles extraordinary emotions and hopes, since oil is above all a great 
temptation. It is the temptation of ease, wealth, strength, fortune, power. It is a filthy, 
foul-smelling liquid that squirts obligingly up into the air and falls back to earth as a 
rustling shower of money. To discover and possess the source of oil is to feel as if, 
after wandering long underground, you have suddenly stumbled upon royal treasure. 
Not only do you become rich, but you are also visited by the mystical conviction that 
some higher power has looked upon you with the eye of grace and magnanimously 
elevated you above others, electing you its favorite. Many photographs preserve the 
moment when the first oil spurts from the well: people jumping for joy, falling into 
each other’s arms, weeping. Oil creates the illusion of a completely changed life, life 
without work, life for free. Oil is a resource that anesthetizes thought, blurs vision, 
corrupts. People from poor countries go around thinking: God, if only we had oil! The 
concept of oil expresses perfectly the eternal human dream of wealth achieved 
through lucky accident, through a kiss of fortune and not by sweat, anguish, hard 
work. In this sense oil is a fairy tale and, like every fairy tale, a bit of a lie.
Ryszard Kapuściński, Shah of Shahs
1.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The World Bank’s 2013 World Development Indicators (WDI) once again make 
sobering reading on development in Africa. Marcelo Guigale (2013), the World 
Bank’s Director of Economic Policy and Poverty  Reduction Programs for Africa, 
highlights the most problematic finding: “When you look at the list of countries with 
the highest incidence of extreme poverty -- say, above 40 percent of the population -- 
you can't help  noting that most of them are rich or very rich in natural resources, 
things like oil, gas or minerals.” Likewise, Ori (2013) reports that “currently, African 
nations with fewer natural resources are making better progress in combating poverty 
than resource-rich countries such as Equatorial Guinea.” Particularly  astonishing, is 
that since the late 1990s Equatorial Guinea has  “enjoyed exceptionally  high revenues 
from petroleum exports” (Europa 2012:1671) and “in 2004 rapid expansion of the 
hydrocarbon industry led to spectacular GDP growth of 31.7%”(Europa 2012:1673). 
As a result, Equatorial Guinea boasts the highest GDP per capita in Africa: $27, 478 
(2011): it is classed as a high income country by the World Bank (2013b). 
1
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Yet, completely  at odds with this figure, is the fact that Equatorial Guinea is currently 
one of the lowest ranked countries in the United Nations Development Programme’s 
(UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI): 136 out of 187 countries (UNDP 2013). 
The Europa World Year Book 2012 (2012:1673) notes:
 Absence of any visible improvement in the living standards among the general 
 population since the early 1990s (in January 2006 the UN Development 
 Programme announced that  more than 70% of Equato-Guineans subsisted in 
 poverty  on less than $2 per day) has been variously attributed to corruption, 
 the disadvantageous terms of many contracts negotiated by the state petroleum 
 company, and reduced international aid.
Mills (2010:2) argues that “far from being the fount for development, Africa’s oil 
wealth has served instead to enrich elites.” Nowhere is this more evident than in 
Equatorial Guinea which Taylor (2010:138) notes is “routinely described as a 
‘criminal state’.” Consequently, although “oil represents 92 percent of its total 
exports, and despite a sudden inrush in capital in terms of both investment and 
receipts from oil, there has been minimal improvement in the economic and social 
welfare of its citizens” (Taylor 2010:139). Bridge and Le Billion (2013:125) similarly 
describe how, “oil seduces those who would control it, feeding dreams of instant 
wealth and economic transformation [...] Developing through oil is an aspiration for 
many oil-producing countries but the reality  in everyday life for many [...] falls far 
short of this goal.” It is important to remember that, “Government revenues should 
not be confused with the flow of benefits to citizens” (Bridge and Le Billion 
2013:140). In the case of Equatorial Guinea this point really cannot be stressed 
enough, as little oil revenue escapes the kleptocratic grasps of the ruling elite. As a 
result, it is an archetypal example of a ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regime.
1.2 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
Whilst the World Bank league tables suggest Equatorial Guinea is doing swimmingly 
with its vast GDP increases, its people are drowning in the misery  of poverty. Only 
the elites benefit from the oil wealth, creaming off huge sums—US-based Riggs Bank 
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acknowledged that some US$500million had been paid into an account to which 
President Obiang Nguema was the sole signatory; international petroleum companies 
were alleged to be the source of the funds (Europa 2012:1671)—to fund lavish 
lifestyles. Meanwhile, their people live on less than US$2 a day. Shaxson (2008:122) 
draws the disturbing contrast between one of Equatorial Guinea’s plush oil congress’s 
and how:
 
 Outside the big hall [...] restrained by  a low wall and the soldiers, people in 
 tattered shirts and flip-flops stood in dirty brown groups, watching and 
 listening. The chances are that they  cannot  afford doctors, one in six of their 
 children die before their fifth birthday, and  their drinking water tastes of mud.
Fernando Abaga, an Equatorial Guinean UN economist describes how “oil has 
worsened the differences between our citizens [...] An opulent majority  sails in a sea 
of misery” (Abaga quoted in Shaxson 2008:122). Similarly, Clarke (2007:91) 
describes the oil enclave, created in the capital, Malabo as: “islands of prosperous oil 
modernity amid a sea of traditional deprivation.” Such a situation has led many to 
declare that Equatorial Guinea is crippled by a ‘resource curse’. It is, however, the 
case that the situation has been steadily  developing since independence in 1968. The 
discovery  of oil has only seen growing attention paid to the situation in Equatorial 
Guinea and provided increased bounty  for the neo-patrimonial elites to feed off. To 
fully  understand the current situation in Equatorial Guinea, it is necessary  to trace the 
development of neo-patrimonialism in the country since independence and the 
concurrent underdevelopment of the country. The discovery  of oil is just  one element 
in this tawdry story; along with the colonial legacy and the role of the ruling Nguema 
family.
Ghazvinian (2007:175) explains that, “in a country so small and so oil-rich that it 
ships close to one [US] $50 barrel of oil for each of its citizens every single day, this 
wealth has had little impact on the population.” This fact is supported by Runge and 
Shikwati (2011:10) who note that “geological resources have been synonymous to 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s curse of underdevelopment. Weak political governance and 
institutional structures on the continent transformed the vast  valuable geological 
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resources into a nightmare for the citizenry.” The disastrous effect that oil has had on 
Africa and Equatorial Guinea in particular is summed up by Shaxson (2008:1):
 
 Producing oil seems to be a bit  like taking cocaine: if you are already healthy 
 it might invigorate you, but if you are weak or sick, as many African countries 
 are it can do serious harm [...] Oil can also be a bit  like heroin: the injection 
 of cash from each cargo delivers a feeling of well-being, but the effect over 
 time is addiction. Just as heroin addicts lose interest in work, health, family, 
 and friends and focus increasingly on the next fix, so politicians in oil-
 dependent countries lose interest in their fellow citizens, as they try to get  
 access to the free cash. 
The idea is that oil corrupts all. If only oil had never been discovered. In the case of 
Equatorial Guinea however, it is not the oil itself that is the problem, more the people 
in control of it. There exists in Equatorial Guinea a deeply-embedded neo-patrimonial 
political culture. Its roots lie in the colonial legacy of the country and its development 
and normalisation is down to the Nguema family who have been in control since 
independence from Spain in 1968. It is their personalisation of the state as their own 
property  and their dining out on its resources that is responsible for the malaise that 
Equatorial Guinea suffers from; making it one of the most underdeveloped states in 
Africa. This is completely at odds with its vast GDP per capita growth over the last 
two decades. Since the discovery  of oil in the late 1990s and the accelerated rate of its 
extraction and the profits that result  from this, there has been a mistaken label of a 
‘resource curse’ attached to explain the disastrous underdevelopment that continues to 
plague Equatorial Guinea. However, it  is in fact the entrenched political culture of 
neo-patrimonialism that is to blame. Indeed, Clarke (2010:528) describes how “the oil 
resource curse in Africa has [...] become the fashionable poster child for Africa’s 
woes.” Furthermore, there is:
 
 A misunderstanding of the source of most difficulties cited as endemic to oil 
 [...] as if the absence of the oil industry would have created a better state of 
 affairs and oil patrimony has  been the sole cause of a presumed once-utopian 
 world. The many  responsibilities and faults  of governments are often skirted 
 around (Clarke 2010:529).
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Oil should not be seen as the cause of Equatorial Guinea’s malaise. It is merely  an 
instrument used by  the ruling elites for self-enrichment. Indeed, Ghazvinian 
(2007:177) believes it  “fair to say that Equatorial Guinea is less a functioning country 
than it  is a lucrative family business that happens to come with a flag, an anthem, an 
army, and a seat at the United Nations.” The reason why the Nguema’s can run 
Equatorial Guinea as though it is merely their family business (albeit one valued at 
hundreds of millions of US dollars)  is because they  operate within a neo-patrimonial 
system.
Such a system, according to Chabal and Daloz (1999:16), means that “the state is no 
more than a décor, a pseudo, Western façade masking the realities of deeply 
personalized political relations. There may well appear to be a relative 
institutionalization of the main state structures but such bodies are largely devoid of 
authority.” Such a system is a combination of patrimonialism—“where power is 
concentrated in the personal authority of one individual ruler [...] The leader is above 
the law, and indeed often makes the law by personal decree [...] patrimonial leaders 
treat all political and administrative concerns of state as their own personal affairs. 
The state is their private property, and the act of ruling is, consequently, quite 
arbitrary” (Thomson 2010:117)—and a legal-rational bureaucracy (dominant in the 
Western system)—in which “Governments rule on the citizen’s behalf, formulating, 
executing and enforcing laws designed to advance the collective good [...] those 
within the state officiate impersonally, putting society’s interests above their own. A 
bureaucratic culture of public service overrides any ideas officials may harbour about 
using  state institutions for their own private gain” (Thomson 2010:110). In the case 
of Equatorial Guinea, it  will become apparent that neo-patrimonialism accounts for 
the political culture there, with a closer resemblance to the pre-colonial culture of 
patrimonialism than the legal-rational bureaucracy that it was hoped would take hold 
following independence in 1968. Indeed, the political culture in Equatorial Guinea is 
perhaps best summed up  by Jackson and Rosberg’s (1982:18) observation of 
governance in Africa as being “more a matter of seamanship and less one of 
navigation—that is, staying afloat rather than going somewhere.” Politics are to blame 
for the underdevelopment of Equatorial Guinea, not oil—although it  does certainly 
5
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
grease the wheels of the patrimonial machine. Leonard and Straus (2003:1) observe 
that “Sub-Saharan Africa’s development problems are inseparable from its politics.” 
Correspondingly, Leftwich (2000:11) argues that “the centrality of politics to 
development cannot be stressed strongly  enough.” Furthermore, “it is nowhere more 
important than in Africa to establish why politics has been both so venal and often so 
brutal, why state formation has been so ‘disordered’ and why, in consequence, 
developmental performance has been so weak” (Leftwich 2000:86). Undoubtedly, 
‘venal’, ‘brutal’ and ‘disordered’ sum up politics in Equatorial Guinea. ‘Disorder’ 
characterises neo-patrimonialism according to Chabal and Daloz  (1999:xix) and is 
key to it ‘working’, in its own way:
!
! The notion of disorder should not be construed, as it normally is in classical 
 political analysis, merely as a state of dereliction. It  should also be seen as a 
 condition which offers opportunities for those who know how to play  the 
 system. Whether, however, such a situation is conducive to (economic and 
 political) development as it is normally understood is a totally different  
 question.
Taylor (2010:3) illustrates how: 
 Under a neo-patrimonial system the separation of public from the private is 
 recognized (even if in practice only on paper) and is certainly  publicly 
 displayed through the outward manifestations of the rational-bureaucratic 
 state—a flag, borders, a government and bureaucracy, etc. However, in 
 practical terms the private and public spheres are habitually not detached and 
 the outward manifestations of statehood are often facades hiding the real 
 workings of the system.
The neo-patrimonial system of government is “nefarious to good governance” 
according to Chabal (2009:70) and Lockwood (2006:5) describes how, “behind a 
formal facade of sovereign government, informal patronage relations have 
undermined the capacity of states to plan and deliver development projects [...] A 
downward spiral into corruption has been the result.” As a result of such practices, 
Leftwich (2008) believes that the state in Africa closely  resembles France under Louis 
6
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XIV and a belief that ‘L’État c’est moi’.1  This is a mind-set that is undoubtedly held 
by President Obiang Nguema who is “like God in heaven. He has all power over men 
and things” (Shaxson 2008:125). This thesis will examine how the kleptocratic 
tendencies of the Obiang family and the system of neo-patrimonialism (in particular 
the weakness of state institutions as a result of the colonial legacy) that dominates 
Equatorial Guinea explain the dire situation of underdevelopment that continues to 
plague the country.
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND FOCUS
The World Bank (2013) has found that resource-rich countries are less successful at 
alleviating poverty than resource-poor countries. Given the vast GDP per capita of 
Equatorial Guinea, compared to other African states, it  cannot be denied that there are 
the resources available to tackle poverty head on. The problem, it would therefore 
seem, is the management and utilisation of these resources. The key explanation for 
this paradoxical state of affairs, is the dominance of neo-patrimonialism in the 
Equatorial Guinean political system. This political culture existed long before the 
discovery  of oil in the 1990s. The increased focus on Equatorial Guinea: once the 
armpit of Africa (Shaxson 2008:29); now being heralded as the Kuwait of the 
continent (Woods 2004:547) has meant that oil has been (erroneously) blamed for the 
country’s woes. In fact, oil has just acted to grease the wheels of the existing neo-
patrimonial machine that dominates the Nguema regime. The focus of this research 
will therefore be: How has the system of neo-patrimonialism developed and become 
entrenched in Equatorial Guinea to the extent that it  is now the norm? The research 
will provide a chronological study of the establishment of neo-patrimonialism in 
Equatorial Guinea from independence to the present day. It will primarily focus on: 
the colonial legacy; the role of the Nguema family  and; the discovery and extraction 
of oil. By producing such a study  it will be possible to see how and why neo-
patrimonialism has had such a detrimental effect on Equatorial Guinea and as a result, 
why, despite being one of Africa’s richest states in terms of resources, Equatorial 
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property to do with as he wished — it was to prove his ultimate downfall.
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Guinea is one of the continent’s poorest performers in terms of poverty  and inequality 
alleviation.
1.4 GOALS, THEORETICAL POINTS OF DEPARTURE, RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS
As the problem statement articulated, this thesis will be focused on providing an 
explanation of the role that neo-patrimonialism has played in the underdevelopment 
of the Equatorial Guinean state. By focusing on how the system of neo-
patrimonialism has developed in Equatorial Guinea it will be possible to see how the 
normalisation of such a system provides an explanation for why despite having the 
highest GDP per capita on the African continent (and by a significant amount), 
Equatorial Guinea is consistently ranked at the bottom end of the UNDP’s HDI. 
The research question that will act as the spring board for this study is: How did neo-
patrimonialism take hold in Equatorial Guinea and how does this system explain the 
desperate state of the country today? 
This research question will then be sub-divided into three smaller, more manageable 
sub-questions in order to tackle the research in a systematic and logical manner.
 
1. How did the Spanish colonial legacy provide the conditions for neo-
patrimonialism to develop in Equatorial Guinea? 
2. How has the Nguema family  entrenched neo-patrimonialism in Equatorial Guinea 
to the extent that  it has become the modus operandi for all state activities and 
makes it a unique example of neo-patrimonialism in Africa? 
3. How has the discovery of oil in the 1990s and the resultant vast revenues provided 
by its extraction sustained the neo-patrimonial system to the extent that the 
personal and legal-rational are indivisible; leading to a state of L’État c’est moi? 
As Woods (2004:547) makes clear, “Whilst accumulation centring on a tiny  elite is 
widespread on the African continent, the concentration and nature of the activity have 
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had particularly adverse consequences in Equatorial Guinea.” It is for this reason that 
a focus on the processes of neo-patrimonialism in Equatorial Guinea has been chosen, 
so that an understanding can be built of the “complex and dynamic web of elite rent-
generation and [...] the extent to which the development of an oil industry has 
contributed to a monoculture of accumulation” (Woods 2004:547-48). It is this 
monoculture of accumulation that dominates the neo-patrimonial system that 
characterises the political economy of Equatorial Guinea and is responsible for the 
continued underdevelopment of this ‘armpit of Africa’.
Before proceeding, it is vital to define two key terms that are central to the study. 
These are: neo-patrimonialism and underdevelopment.
✦Neo-patrimonialism: Thomson (2010:128) defines patrimonial rule as “political 
authority based on an individual, where the state itself, and the affairs of the state are 
the personal interests of the ruler. All within this political system owe their position 
and loyalty to the one leader.” Neo-patrimonial rule is therefore “where patrimonial 
rule is exercised through the remnants of legal-rational institutions (Thomson 
2010:128).” A quasi-system operates. On the outside, grand suggestions of good 
governance can be made, whilst behind the facade, the smoke-filled rooms of 
corruption and patronage are where the real decisions are made (Kelsall 2002:597). 
✦Underdevelopment: refers to an economy that has not yet reached its full potential 
and therefore development is slower than it should be. Underdeveloped countries are 
characterised by their distinct wealth disparity.
This study will be based on the theory  of neo-patrimonialism and this concept will be 
introduced and defined fully  in chapter two before being further explored over the 
course of the thesis to show how it is the central explanation for the current malaise 
affecting Equatorial Guinea. 
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1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODS AND LIMITATIONS
This study will comprise a qualitative examination of secondary  material readily-
available in the public domain. Initially a literature survey of the existing theory of 
neo-patrimonialism will be undertaken before adopting a theoretical framework to be 
applied to the case study of Equatorial Guinea. Consequently, a historical account and 
political analysis will be provided through an exploratory and explanatory  research 
design. As a result, it  will be possible to trace and explain the development and 
entrenchment of neo-patrimonialism in Equatorial Guinea and therefore provide a 
clear understanding of why an analysis of Equatorial Guinea through a neo-
patrimonial theoretical lens is central to understanding the current malaise that affects 
the state.
Whilst it would be beneficial to undertake primary data collection in Equatorial 
Guinea, this is not  feasible due to to restrictions on time, finances, space and the 
security situation which would have to be negotiated before and during a visit to 
Equatorial Guinea.  As a preliminary  survey of the literature readily available on the 
regime and country, in general, make clear, those researchers who have successfully 
gained entry into Equatorial Guinea, have more often than not had their fieldwork cut 
short and at times data and notes destroyed—this highlights the highly secretive 
nature of the regime and is evidence both of their repressive behaviour and their 
intolerance to criticism. As a result of the sensitive nature of the subject in Equatorial 
Guinea it  is only possible to work with information that is already  in the public 
domain. Any figures and statistics quoted are from international organisations 
including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and United Nations 
departments to ensure the utmost accuracy. Indeed, these figures are likely  to give a 
truer picture than any provided by the Equatorial Guinean state.
A further limitation in regards to the resources available is that there is a relative 
dearth of material available, particularly prior to the oil boom which began in the 
mid-1990s. Moreover, the majority of literature available covering the colonial and 
early post-colonial period is published in Spanish. This does, however, make the case 
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for why this study is so important  as it highlights the relative lack of attention paid to 
Equatorial Guinea in comparison to more widely acknowledged neo-patrimonial 
regimes, such as Zimbabwe.
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
The remainder of the study will be illustrated through four further chapters. The study 
will follow in chronological order so that a clear picture is created of how a system of 
neo-patrimonialism has developed and become entrenched over time, from Spanish 
colonialism, through the initial period of independence to the so-called ‘resource 
curse’ that has engulfed Equatorial Guinea since the discovery  and subsequent 
extraction of oil in the mid-1990s. 
Chapter two provides a theoretical overview of existing literature concerning neo-
patrimonialism. It then details the adoption of the chosen framework for analysis—
that of Bach (2012) and Bavister-Gould’s (2011) idea of ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial 
regimes which explain what is happening in Equatorial Guinea and Chabal and 
Daloz’s (199) ‘disorder as a political instrument’ to explain why  the system has 
endured for so long and looks set to remain. By doing this, it is possible to provide a 
clear theoretical framework which can be applied to analyse neo-patrimonialism in 
the specific case of Equatorial Guinea.
The third chapter has a strong historical element as it traces the roots of a system of 
neo-patrimonialism in Equatorial Guinea. It begins by  detailing the experience of 
Equatorial Guinea under Spanish colonialism and how this sowed the seeds for neo-
patrimonialism to develop  upon independence being granted in 1968. The second half 
of the chapter is focused on the regime of the first post-independence president; 
Macías Nguema and paints a comprehensive, tragi-comic and shocking picture of a 
dictatorial regime that rivalled only Amin and Bokassa for brutality and bizarreness. 
Overall, this chapter provides a clear basis for the development of a deep-rooted 
system of neo-patrimonialism in Equatorial Guinea.
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Chapter four is concerned with the entrenchment of neo-patrimonialism in Equatorial 
Guinea. It describes the regime of Obiang Nguema and highlights the fact that any 
hopes of there being a break with the dictatorial ways of Macías were soon dashed. 
The focal argument in this chapter is that neo-patrimonialism in Equatorial Guinea 
under Obiang has become all-consuming to the extent that  the state now resembles a 
family business rather than a functioning legal-rational bureaucratic state of a Western 
ideal. The latter part of the chapter provides a commentary of the discovery of oil in 
Equatorial Guinea and the effect  that  this has had on the prospects of the state: serving 
only to fuel an already well-established neo-patrimonial regime. It also muses on the 
potential to curb the excesses of the regime through transparency initiatives and how 
their lack of success to-date, could be improved upon in the future. In sum, this 
chapter paints a clear picture of the depressing state that Equatorial Guinea finds itself 
in currently  despite having the highest GDP per capita in Africa; and explains how the 
theory  of neo-patrimonialism is central to explaining and in turn understanding why 
the development prospects for Equatorial Guinea are so uninspiring and 
disappointing.
Finally, chapter five brings together and summarises the preceding study. It provides 
an overview of the findings and makes clear the answers to the research questions and 
hypothesis detailed in this introductory chapter. It  highlights the sorry  state of affairs 
in Equatorial Guinea and justifies why the neo-patrimonial theory is central for 
understanding the quandary that the Equatorial Guinean state is in and how the case 
study displays a unique and fascinating example of an African neo-patrimonial state. 
Lastly, this chapter contemplates the potentiality for further research and highlights 
the need for greater attention to be paid to this heretofore neglected state in the armpit 
of West  Africa due to its growing role in international relations; most notably  through 
its centrality to the world oil market. Furthermore, an attempt is made to predict what 
the future may hold for Equatorial Guinea once the oil runs out and the potential for a 
regime change.
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CHAPTER II
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW OF NEO-
PATRIMONIALISM
“The ship of state is the only ship that leaks from the top”
 Sir Humphrey Appleby, Yes, Minister
2.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Understanding the theory of, and existing literature on neo-patrimonialism is 
necessary  in order to fully  grasp the concept, its applicability  to Africa generally, and 
Equatorial Guinea specifically. This chapter begins by introducing the concept of neo-
patrimonialism before providing a comprehensive overview of the literature which 
has already  been produced to illustrate this phenomenon. The development of the 
theory will be traced from its roots in Weber’s ‘traditional’ authority of 
patrimonialism to it’s current incarnation as neo-patrimonialism: combining both 
traditional patronage and a modern legal-rational bureaucracy  in a hybridised system. 
An outline of the theoretical framework which will be adopted is also given as well as 
an explanation given as to why such a framework has been chosen. This chapter leads 
the way for the analysis of the development of neo-patrimonialism in Equatorial 
Guinea which comprises the remainder of this thesis. 
2.2 CONCEPTUALISATION: NEO-PATRIMONIALISM
According to Leonard and Straus (2003:2) the popularised image of Africa is as, “a 
continent of corrupt dictators who preside over fractious populations.” Whilst such a 
statement has a propensity  to enforce Afro-pessimist opinions, they  argue that such an 
opinion of African politics “has a long pedigree in scholarship on the continent” and 
“reflects an academic consensus about the modal dynamics of African politics—the 
personal rule paradigm.” It is the prominence of personal rule with which the concept 
of neo-patrimonialism is primarily concerned. Indeed, Leftwich (2008:213) notes that 
“there is the absence of any sharp distinction between the rulers and the institutions of 
rule.” As a result, the state in Africa is often seen as the personal property  of the 
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president, a modern-day example of ‘L’État c’est moi’ popularised by Louis XIV in 
seventeenth-century  France (Leftwich 2008:213). Similarly, van de Walle (2001:16) 
describes how the weakness of the state in Africa following decolonisation meant that 
it “became neopatrimonial, combining an external facade of modern rational-legal 
administration with an internal patrimonial logic of dyadic exchange, prebendalism, 
and the private appropriation of public resources by state elites.” It is this combining 
of the traditional and modern; private and public; institutionalised and informal which 
defines neo-patrimonialism and emphasises its unique nature on the African continent. 
Thomson (2010:110) describes how: 
 At first glance, the continent’s political institutions such as parliaments and 
 executives, may seem familiar, but a closer examination reveals these 
 institutions to be very different from those found in the West. The façade of a 
 legal-rational bureaucracy may  remain, but behind this façade lies a 
 completely different political environment [...] ‘personal rule’ superseded any 
 notion of ‘legal-rationalism’.”
Similarly, Taylor (2010:3) explains that:
 Under a neo-patrimonial system the separation of public from the private is 
 recognized (even if in practice only on paper) and is certainly  publicly 
 displayed through outward manifestations of the rational-bureaucratic state—a 
 flag, borders, a government and bureaucracy, etc. However, in practical terms 
 the private and public spheres are habitually not detached and the outward 
 manifestations of statehood are often facades hiding the real workings of the 
 system [...] Many postcolonial African leaders have rather relied on effected 
 control and patronage.
Although neo-patrimonialism does not apply to all states on the African continent, it is 
widely  believed that a large proportion of its states do exhibit features which have 
become attributable to a system of neo-patrimonialism. It should also be noted (as will 
be expanded upon later in this chapter) that there are different degrees of neo-
patrimonialism, from the regulated system in Botswana to the all-encompassing 
predatory form which—this study  will argue—is seen in Equatorial Guinea. Indeed, 
Bach (2012:29) stresses that, “political systems where patrimonial practices tend to be 
regulated and capped should be distinguished from those where the patrimonialism of 
the state has become all-encompassing, with the consequent loss of any sense of 
public space or public policy.” As such it is possible to see neo-patrimonialism located 
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on a continuum: the modern legal-rational bureaucracy  (the Western ideal) would 
occupy  one extreme, with the ‘traditional’ patrimonial system at the other. Neo-
patrimonialism could be seen as occupying the middle ground: a hybrid system which 
encompasses both aspects. It is also a fluid concept, which depending on the 
leadership style could see a state moving along the continuum in either direction: 
becoming more or less regulated or predatory.
Predatory
 neo-patrimonial system
Regulated
neo-patrimonial system
Traditional Patriomonial 
system
Legal-Rational 
Bureaucracy
Neo-patrimonial continuum
Figure 1: Neo-patrimonialism continuum (author’s own model devised from Bach’s (2012) theory of neo-
patrimonialism).
Bratton and van de Walle (1994:458), leading proponents of the theory  of neo-
patrimonialism, make clear the centrality  of neo-patrimonial theory  to politics in 
Africa, describing it  as “the distinctive institutional hallmark of African regimes.” 
They  also emphasise that, “while neopatrimonial practice can be found in all polities, 
it is the core feature of politics in Africa” (Bratton and van de Walle 1994:459). 
Therefore, Bratton and van de Walle (1994:459) argue that neo-patrimonialism is the 
central model for analysing politics in Africa:
 Personal relationships are a factor at the margins of all bureaucratic systems, 
 but in Africa they constitute the foundation and superstructure of political 
 institutions. The interaction between the “big man” and his extended retinue 
 defines African politics, from the highest reaches of the presidential palace to 
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 the humblest village assembly. As such, analysts of African politics have 
 embraced the neopatrimonial model.
In sum, the neo-patrimonial model has become the central scholarly explanation of 
why politics in Africa operates so differently to that of the Western ideal of legal-
rational bureaucracy. Moreover, Chabal and Daloz (1999:9) note that “the neo-
patrimonial approach seeks to make sense of the (real or imaginary) contradictions to 
be found in the state in sub-Saharan Africa.” As Hyden (2013:97) emphasises, 
“personal rule remains prominent in Africa.” This is enacted most obviously through 
the system of neo-patrimonialism. This hybrid system—straddling both the 
patrimonial methods of ‘traditional’ authority popular in pre-colonial Africa and the 
legal-rational bureaucracy  that was introduced to modernise the state at decolonisation
—dominates politics on the African continent and a clear understanding of it is 
necessary  in order to make sense of how such apparent ‘disorder’ actually 
‘works’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999), and as a result why this system of governance has 
endured on the continent for so long. We shall now turn to the development of this 
concept in order to provide such an explanation.
2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW: FROM PATRIMONIALISM TO NEO-
PATRIMONIALISM
Since it was first applied to the study of African politics in the late 1970s by  Médard, 
the body  of literature on neo-patrimonialism has grown to the extent that it has 
become the definitive theory for describing how politics have played out on the 
African continent since independence (Bach 2012; Hyden 2000). As with any political 
science theory, there are of course discrepancies between the different theorists, with 
unique observations made by  specific works. On the whole, however, there is broad-
based agreement on what constitutes neo-patrimonialism and how this is evident in 
politics on the African continent. The existing literature will be reviewed and 
analysed, highlighting both strengths and weaknesses of the theories and the 
advantages and disadvantages to adopting different explanations. The development of 
the theory  will be traced, before the theoretical framework (which will be adopted for 
later analysis) of Bach (2012), Bavister-Gould (2011) and Chabal and Daloz (1999) is 
introduced. These theories help to explain what is happening in Equatorial Guinea 
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(Bach 2012; Bavister-Gould 2011); whilst  Chabal and Daloz’s (1999) notion of 
‘disorder as a political instrument’ is central to understanding why neo-
patrimonialism’s normalisation means that it is likely to endure, as it is not in the 
interests of the ruling elite to adapt it to encourage broad-based development that 
would benefit the populace as a whole.
In one of the earliest works on neo-patrimonialism in Africa, Jackson and Rosberg 
(1982:18) illustrate that, “in African countries governance is more a matter of 
seamanship and less one of navigation—that is, staying afloat rather than going 
somewhere.” Their comment is by no means a unique observation of African politics. 
Mills (2010:16) notes that “bad choices have been made because better choices in the 
broad public interest were in many cases not in the leaders’ personal and often 
financial self-interest.” Indeed, Smith (2008:234) explains that, “too often, especially 
in Africa, the alternative to a developmental state has been a predatory state led by 
‘rapacious officialdom’. At the extreme, the state becomes a kleptocracy: less an 
agency for providing law, order, security, justice, and welfare, and more a device for 
endowing the political elite with power, wealth, and privilege.” Similarly, Leonard 
and Straus (2003:3) describe how, “little distinction is made between the ruler and the 
state—an extreme form of seeing government as personal property—and the ruler’s 
personal decisions always take precedence over formal laws.” The term attributed to 
such a system is neo-patrimonialism.
It is generally  agreed that the roots of the theory of neo-patrimonialism lie in Weber’s 
definition of ‘traditional’ authority: patrimonialism (Leftwich 2008; Thomson 2010; 
van de Walle 2001; Kelsall 2011; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Theobald 1990; 
Hyden 2000; Gazibo 2012; Bruhns 2012; Bach 2012; Sandbrook and Barker 1985). 
Thomson (2010:117) explains that:
 Patrimonialism is similar to personal rule. It is a form of political order where 
 power is concentrated in the personal authority of one individual ruler. The 
 leader gains this position from their status in society. He or she may  be bound 
 by traditions or customs, but there are no legal-rational constraints on 
 government. The leader is above the law, and indeed often  makes the law by 
 personal decree. In this respect, patrimonial leaders treat all political and 
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 administrative concerns of the state as their own personal affairs. The state is 
 their private property, and the act of ruling is, consequently, quite arbitrary.
Similarly, Sandbrook and Barker (1985:89) note that:
 Sultanism, as Weber calls it, or personal rule is [...] a form of patrimonialism 
 that arises when rulers have no constitutional, charismatic-revolutionary or 
 traditional legitimacy. A chief or strongman emerges and rules on the basis of 
 material incentives and personal control of his administration and armed force. 
 Fear and personal loyalties are the mainstays of a personalistic government 
 untrammelled by traditional or modern constitutional limitations. 
In other words, the state and its leader are inseparable; the leader rules as though the 
state is their personal property, with which they can do as they wish. Indeed, Kelsall 
(2011:76) describes how the system of patrimonialism “is held together by the 
personal distribution of material resources and perks [...] distributed and consumed as 
though they were the private property  of the ruler and/or his staff.” Weber (1978 
quoted in Hyden 2013:98) defined the system as follows:
 The patrimonial office lacks above all the bureaucratic separation of the 
 “private” and  “official” sphere. For the political administration, too, is treated 
 as a purely personal affair of  the ruler, and political power is considered part 
 of his personal property  [...] The office and  the exercise of public authority 
 serve the ruler and the official on which the office was bestowed; they do not  
 serve impersonal purposes.
Such a system of governance is clearly at odds with the legal-rational bureaucracy 
that has come to dominate and define the Westphalian system. Bratton and van de 
Walle (1997:62) explain that, “Weber distinguished patrimonial authority from legal-
rational authority, in which the public sphere is carefully distinguished from the 
private sphere; written laws and bureaucratic institutions routinize the exercise of 
authority and protect individuals and their property from the whims of capricious 
leaders.” It is such a system that is exhibited throughout the Western world of liberal 
democracies. According to Leftwich (2008:214), “many characteristics and functions 
distinguish the modern state. But it was the development of institutions of rule and 
governing which were formally  separated from not just the rulers but the officials who 
ran them, on the one hand, and the citizenry, on the other hand, that was central in the 
shift from what Weber called ‘traditional’ forms of rule and authority, including 
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patrimonial politics, to the modern state.” Sandbrook and Barker (1985:115) note that 
“Weber believed that only bureaucracy could provide modern capitalism with what it 
required.” The characteristics that would be possessed by his ideal bureaucratic 
organisation included: “(1) the definition of a fixed jurisdiction for each public office; 
(2) the arrangement of those offices in hierarchical order; (3) the appointment and 
promotion of employees on the grounds of technical competence and training; (4) the 
separation of public office from the officeholder’s private or business activities; and 
(5) the treatment of employment in an office as a full time, permanent 
job” (Sandbrook and Barker 1985:115-16).
A cursory  glance at  bureaucracies and the wider running of states shows that such an 
ideal is rarely found on the African continent. Thomson (2010:110) describes how, “it 
was legal-rational government [...] that was meant to underlie the state authority in 
post-colonial Africa. This was to be provided by  liberal democratic institutions left by 
the imperial powers.” The success of such a transformation, however, was not 
achieved. Jackson and Rosberg (1982:1) believe that “politics in most Black African 
states do not conform to an institutionalized system [...] Politics are more personalized 
and less restrained.” Indeed, Chabal and Daloz (1999:8) describe the state in Africa 
as, “in Weberian terms, no more than an artificially ‘modern’ political edifice.” 
Similarly, Kelsall (2002:597) notes that whilst outward grand gestures of good 
governance may be made, the real decisions are made in the smoke-filled rooms 
dominated by corruption and patronage networks, that lie behind this façade. It is this 
combination of the legal-rational bureaucracy that defines the ‘modern’ state with the 
patrimonial system of the ‘traditional’ state defined by Weber that gives rise to a 
system of neo-patrimonialism. Bratton and van de Walle (1997:62), provide the 
following succinct, yet all-encompassing explanation of neo-patrimonialism.
 As with classical patrimonialism, the right to rule in neopatrimonial regimes is 
 ascribed to a person rather than to an office, despite the official existence of a 
 written constitution. One individual [...] often a president for life, dominates 
 the state apparatus and stands above its laws [...] Officials occupy bureaucratic 
 positions less to perform public service, their ostensible purpose, than to 
 acquire personal wealth and status...The chief executive and his inner circle 
 undermine the effectiveness of the nominally modern state administration by 
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 using it for systematic patronage and clientelist  practices in order to maintain 
 political order. Moreover, parallel and unofficial structures may well hold 
 more power and authority than the formal administration. To summarize, the 
 characteristic feature of neopatrimonialism is the incorporation of patrimonial 
 logic into bureaucratic institutions.
Lockwood (2006:5) similarly notes that: “a common observation is that African states 
are hybrid in nature. Budgets, laws, bureaucracy, cabinet and parliament are all 
features of modern African states but they coexist with personal rule and patronage.” 
Thomson (2010:110) describes how “legal-rational institutions did not prosper in 
Africa after independence [...] Power was removed from civil society and peripheral 
institutions of the state, and hoarded instead within the core executive, often with just 
one individual being dominant.” As a result, Chabal and Daloz (1999:95) believe that, 
“the state in sub-Saharan Africa is nothing other than a relatively  empty shell [...] the 
real business of politics is conducted informally and, more stealthily, outside the 
official political realm.” As a result:
 
 The state is both vacuous and ineffectual. It  is vacuous in that it  did not 
 consolidate, as was once expected, on the foundations of the colonial legacy 
 but instead rapidly disintegrated and fell prey to particularistic and factional 
 struggles. It became an empty shell. As a result it failed to acquire either the 
 legitimacy  or the professional competence which are the hallmarks of the 
 modern state. It  is ineffectual in that it has never been in the interest  of 
 African political elites to work for the proper institutionalization of the state 
 apparatus. Or to put it  another way, its usefulness is greatest when it is least  
 institutionalized (Chabal and  Daloz 1999:14).
It is this central argument that, Chabal and Daloz (1999:xviii) call the “political 
instrumentalization of disorder.” This concept will be elaborated on shortly, where it 
will become apparent that this disorder is “in fact a different ‘order’” (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999:155) which suits those in control of the state as it serves their goal of self-
enrichment. It is “the very weakness and inefficiency of the state [that] has been 
profitable to the African political elites” according to Chabal and Daloz (1999:14) and 
as such, “the instrumentalization of the prevailing political (dis)order is thus a 
disincentive to the establishment of a more properly institutionalized state on the 
Weberian model.” In sum, why would African elites want to reform a system that 
works so well for them?
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2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.4.1 ‘Regulated’ .v. ‘Predatory’ Neo-Patrimonialism
It is, according to van de Walle (2001:51), apparent that “political authority  in Africa 
is based on the giving and granting of favors, in an endless series of dyadic exchanges 
that go from the village level to the highest reaches of the central state.” As a result, it 
can be assumed that, “most African states are hybrid regimes, in which patrimonial 
practices coexist with modern bureaucracy.” Indeed, Jackson and Rosberg (1982:12) 
note that, “almost everywhere in Black Africa, systems of personal rule have come 
into existence.” It should, however, be noted that although neo-patrimonialism is to 
some extent present in the majority  of states in Africa, it is enacted to different 
degrees. This is a observation that has not been highlighted enough by theorists of 
neo-patrimonialism, but is a fact that Bach (2012) makes central to his explanation of 
neo-patrimonialism. He differentiates between ‘regulated’ and ‘predatory’ forms of 
neo-patrimonialism. As was mentioned earlier and is shown in Figure 1, it is possible 
to see these two aspects of neo-patrimonialism as occupying different ends of the 
spectrum that is the neo-patrimonial continuum. 
Whilst Chabal (2009:70) notes that neo-patrimonialism is widely  seen as being 
“nefarious to good governance”, Bach (2012:29) believes that regulated forms, in 
which “the distribution of resources and prebends is sometimes formalized and takes 
place on an inclusive basis”, although not ideal, is the lesser of two evils. This is 
because:
  
 Even though notions such as public ethics and common good may be undercut, 
 regulated neopatrimonialism conveys its own brand of ‘moral economy’, in so 
 far as it  favors redistribution processes that target the national territory [...] The 
 inclusive nature of such practices may also go along with a modulation in 
 scope and intensity: some administrative sectors operate according to 
 legal-bureaucratic rules with the result of a capacity  to generate ‘public’ 
 policies. The imprint  of regulated neopatrimonialism is capped and ringfenced 
 (Bach 2012:29).
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An example of such a system, would be Botswana, where currently neo-
patrimonialism is practiced, but within the established legal-rational bureaucracy of 
what is widely-acknowledged as Africa’s most developed democracy.
The opposite end of the spectrum is ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonialism. This is where 
patrimonial practices dominate the state to such an extent  that any sense of public 
space is lost and legal-bureaucratic rules and measures cease to exist  (Bach 2012). In 
a ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial system, Bach (2012:30) argues that “personal rule and 
control of resources reach a paroxysmic level” and as a result, “the idea of a 
dissociation between public office and the ruler’s private interests tends to become 
irrelevant” (Bach 2012:31). It can therefore be deduced, according to Bach (2012:31) 
that, “the distinction between regulated and predatory forms of neopatrimonialism 
signals the two extremes of a diversity  of empirical configurations [... and] an 
operational distinction should be drawn between neopatrimonialism within the state 
and patterns of neopatrimonialism that permeate the entire state.” The example used 
to illustrate a ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial system is the regime of Mobutu in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaïre) from 1965 to 1997. Bach (2012:31) 
describes how “Mobutu’s ‘predatory’ rule [...] involved the permeation of the state by 
a level of corruption so pervasive as to have become its most visible and defining 
property.” Such a system is, as will be argued and illustrated in the subsequent 
chapters, evidenced by the Nguema regime in Equatorial Guinea. Ghazvinian 
(2008:170) goes so far as to describe it  as a “self-parodying burlesque of a tin-pot 
kleptocracy”, whilst  Williams (2011:621) argues that “there is a strong case to be 
made that Equatorial Guinea has the worst government in the world.” At the very 
least, it will be argued, it  is the archetypal example of ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonialism 
on the African continent. 
The necessity to differentiate ‘predatory’ leadership from other forms of rule in Africa 
is also emphasised by Bavister-Gould (2011) on behalf of the Developmental 
Leadership Program (DLP) whose work is focused on the role of elites. Bavister-
Gould (2011:1) explains that “‘predatory’ rule can be regarded as the extreme 
opposite of ‘developmental’,‘accountable’, or ‘responsive’ forms of rule.” This is a 
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point supported by Cammack (2007:600) who notes that in such regimes the 
“overarching logic is to gain and retain power at all costs. In such circumstances, 
policy decisions about development and governance are subordinated to that single, 
overriding goal.” Such regimes are characterised by the following elements according 
to Bavister-Gould (2011:1-2):
 
(a) a high degree of political power concentrated in personal rule, mediated 
through, and sustained by, what is in effect a narrow ‘predatory coalition’, 
without traditional, ‘customary’ or coherent ideological justification or 
legitimacy; 
(b) the use of this power to control economic resources, accompanied by wide 
discretion in their use or distribution; 
(c) the failure to use such resources for any  observable developmental 
purpose; 
(d) the absence of any plausible or practical evidence of a vision or 
commitment to promote long-term and sustainable growth, development or 
the systematic provision of public goods; 
(e) a ruthless application of coercion and repression to gain and especially 
maintain power; 
(f) the use of a mixture of fear and reward as a means of retaining the loyalty 
of immediate followers and supporters; 
(g) the use of often considerable brutality  and exclusion as the means for 
punishing opponents or competitors; 
(h) the systematic erosion of both public institutions and the rule of law, and 
the transgression of customary institutions; and 
(i) a consequent degradation of the economy.
Bach (2012) and Bavister-Gould’s (2011) theories of ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonialism 
will be adopted to analyse the situation that is found in Equatorial Guinea. Moreover, 
such a ‘predatory’ adaptation of the neo-patrimonial system is in-line with Chabal and 
Daloz’s (1999) theory  of the political instrumentalization of disorder, an examination 
of which, is now undertaken.
2.4.2 The ‘political instrumentalization of disorder’
Africa works! This is the conclusion of Chabal and Daloz (1999). Yes, it is clear that 
in Africa politics are “not ordered in the sense in which we usually  take our own 
polities in the West to be” (Chabal and Daloz 1999:xix). Yet, the apparent disorder 
that is witnessed in neo-patrimonial regimes in Africa, is in fact just a different type of 
order, and it works, or at least it does for those who know how to play the system; 
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namely, the elites in control. Chabal and Daloz (1999:xviii) call this the “political 
instrumentalization of disorder,” which “refers to the processes by which political 
actors in Africa seek to maximize their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty, 
and sometimes even chaos, which characterizes most African polities.” In other 
words, it is by keeping the state as ‘disordered’ as possible that  elites can gained most 
from the state: the more disordered the state apparatus is, the easier it is to undertake 
the characteristic elements of neo-patrimonialism (corruption, rent-seeking, stealing 
resources, personal enrichment). Indeed, the state is most effective for elites when it is 
most ineffective. Chabal and Daloz (1999:14) illustrate this when they argue that the 
state is “ineffectual in that it has never been in the interest of African political elites to 
work for the proper institutionalization of the state apparatus. Or to put it  another way, 
its usefulness is greatest when it is least institutionalized.” As such, it is not in the 
elites interests to reform such a system. Institutionalising the state would only limit 
their ability to do their job (as they view it): profiting from their position. Chabal and 
Daloz’s (1999) point helps to explain the enduring nature of the neo-patrimonial state 
on the African continent and it  is an incredibly  important one to stress. Yet, they  are 
one of only  a few theorists to make such a point: “what we want to stress here, in 
contrast to most  current interpretations, is that there are powerfully instrumental 
reasons for the informalization of politics” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:2).
According to Chabal and Daloz, it is impossible to understand politics in Africa, 
without understanding the way  in which this disorder has been instrumentalized. This 
point is summed up when they argue that:
 To understand politics in such a context is to understand the ways in which 
 individuals, groups and communities seek to instrumentalize the resources 
 which they command within  this general political economy of disorder. To 
 speak of disorder is not, of course, to speak of  irrationality. It is merely to make 
 explicit  the observation that political action operates rationally, but largely in the 
 realm of the informal, uncodified and unpoliced—that is, in a world that is not 
 ordered in the sense in which we usually take our own polities in the West to 
 be (Chabal and Daloz 1999:xix).
The reference to rationality  and the Western viewpoint is also a central reason for 
Chabal and Daloz’s theoretical framework being adopted. They are one of only a few 
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theorists who instead of considering the system of neo-patrimonialism in Africa as a 
failure of modernisation and the adoption of the Western legal-rational bureaucratic 
order, in fact credit the system of neo-patrimonialism in Africa as being both rational 
and an intentional rejection of the Western system. 
 There prevails in Africa a system of politics inimical to development as it is 
 usually  understood in the West. The dynamics of the political 
 instrumentalization of disorder are such  as to limit the scope for reform in at 
 least two ways. The first is that, where disorder has  become a resource, there is 
 no incentive to work for a more institutionalized ordering of society. The second 
 is that in the absence of any other viable way of obtaining the means  needed to 
 sustain neo-patrimonialism, there is inevitably  a tendency to link politics to 
 realms of increased disorder [...] There is therefore an inbuilt bias in favour of 
 greater disorder and against the formation of the Western-style legal, 
 administrative and institutional foundations required for development (Chabal 
 and Daloz 1999:162).
Whilst Chabal and Daloz (1999:104) acknowledge that “such a state of affairs may 
not be desirable in the long term for the country as a whole [...] it remains both 
entirely  coherent and eminently  reasonable for those Africans who can manage to 
benefit from the system as it works.” Therefore, “even if such practices are nefarious 
to the macro-‘development’ of African countries, since it makes rational economic 
activity practically impossible, there are good reasons why they are not likely to 
disappear” (Chabal and Daloz 1999:103). A key point made by Chabal and Daloz 
(1999:xix) is that, “the notion of disorder should not be construed, as it normally is in 
classical political analysis, merely as a state of dereliction. It should also be seen as a 
condition which offers opportunities for those who know how to play  the system.” 
Similarly, Cammack (2007:602) argues that it “is not a dysfunctional public service 
but one that functions according to a different logic.” This logic is the central 
motivation of ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial systems: to treat the state as your own 
personal property and to do with it  as you will as long, as you profit  from it. 
Developing the state has nothing to do with it. It is as Cammack (2007:600) 
succinctly  puts it  “a logic of personal and particularist interest rather than national 
betterment.” It is the neo-patrimonial approach, according to Chabal and Daloz 
(1999:9) that seeks to make sense of such a situation:
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 The neo-patrimonial approach seeks to make sense of the (real or imaginary) 
 contradictions to be found in the state in sub-Saharan Africa. From this 
 perspective, the state is simultaneously  illusory  and substantial. It is illusory 
 because its modus operandi is essentially informal, the rule of law is feebly 
 enforced and the ability  to implement public policy remains most  limited. It is 
 substantial because its control is the ultimate prize for all political elites: 
 indeed, it  is the chief instrument of patrimonialism. The state is thus both strong 
 and powerless, overdeveloped in size and underdeveloped in functional terms.
This final point, emphasising the contradictory  nature of the state, is key to 
understanding and making sense of the operation of the neo-patrimonial system in 
Africa. Indeed, it is Chabal and Daloz’s (1999) emphasis on the nature of the state, 
how disorder is in fact order by  a different logic, and how this disorder ‘works’ that 
makes it (along with Bach (2012) and Bavister-Gould’s (2011) theories of ‘predatory’ 
neo-patrimonialism) one of the most useful theories for analysing the development of 
the neo-patrimonial state in Equatorial Guinea. This is because, in addition to 
explaining what the neo-patrimonial state is (the premise of earlier theories of neo-
patrimonialism), they also explain why such a system exists and as a result why it 
endures and will do so for the foreseeable future. 
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
By providing an overview of the existing literature concerned with the concept of 
neo-patrimonialism it is possible to see both what the premise of the theory  is and also 
its applicability to the example of Equatorial Guinea. The theory of neo-
patrimonialism provides an explanatory  framework for understanding how the 
‘traditional’ system of patrimonialism combines with the modern (primarily Western) 
legal-rational bureaucratic system to create a hybrid system, which accounts for the 
unique nature of politics in Africa. It emphasises that whilst states in Africa may 
possess the characteristics of a modern state: sovereignty, a flag, judiciary, 
bureaucracy, parliament etc. these elements are merely a façade. The real decisions 
are still (largely) made behind closed doors, in the ‘smoke-filled rooms’ through 
highly  personalised methods of governance. Whilst the system of neo-patrimonialism 
is fairly widespread across the African continent, its degree is varied. It should be seen 
as a continuum with ‘traditional’ patrimonialism at one extreme and legal-rational 
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bureaucracy  at the other. Differentiation needs to be made between ‘regulated’ and 
‘predatory’ forms of neo-patrimonialism. ‘Predatory’ regimes bear the closest 
resemblance to the pre-colonial phenomenon of patrimonialism where the state is 
treated as the personal property of the ruler. Such a system permeates the entire state 
to the extent that institutions fail and corruption and kleptocracy become the defining 
characteristics of the state. This concept of ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonialism as 
articulated by Bach (2012) and Bavister-Gould (2011) will be applied to the example 
of Equatorial Guinea. This is because, as will become apparent over the course of the 
remainder of the study, this theory  is a central explanation of how politics is enacted 
in Equatorial Guinea. 
Whilst such a system is largely  at odds with the legal-rational system popularised in 
the West, Chabal and Daloz argue that such a system is seen as rational on the African 
continent, merely operating under a different logic to that of the West. The disorder 
that is witnessed in the state in Africa does in fact work, as it benefits those in control 
of the state. As a result, it has been seen as being in the elites best interests to 
instrumentalise this disorder to ensure that it continues: the more disordered the state 
is, the easier it  is for them to profit from it. Such disorder also accounts for why the 
system of neo-patrimonialism endures on the continent. Why would elites wish to 
reform (by  democratisation) such a system that works so well for them? It  is this 
expanded interpretation of the system of neo-patrimonialism in Africa that makes this 
the most fitting theoretical framework to be adopted in order to explain why  such a 
‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial system has become entrenched in Equatorial Guinea and 
why it is likely to remain in the future.
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CHAPTER III
THE ROOTS OF NEO-PATRIMONIALISM IN EQUATORIAL 
GUINEA: THE COLONIAL LEGACY AND RULE OF MACÍAS 
NGUEMA
“And this also...has been one of the dark places of the earth.”
Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness
3.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Having conceptualised the theory of neo-patrimonialism in the preceding chapter, this 
chapter will serve to illustrate the theory in practice; in order to show how neo-
patrimonialism has taken root and developed in Equatorial Guinea. The chapter will 
begin by  providing a brief overview of the geography and history of this small African 
state. Following on, an insight will be given into the colonial legacy  that was 
bestowed on Equatorial Guinea by the Spanish and how this laid the foundations for a 
system of neo-patrimonialism to take root. Finally, the rule of Macías Nguema (the 
first post-independence president) will be examined to explain how he introduced and 
normalised the system of neo-patrimonialism that became all-encompassing during 
the first eleven years of Equatorial Guinean independence: from 1968 to 1979. 
Overall, this chapter will provide a clear understanding of how neo-patrimonialism 
began to develop in Equatorial Guinea, to the extent that it  can be seen as the central 
explanation of this state’s political system.
3.2 THE GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA
One of the most common observations about Equatorial Guinea, is that it is “one of 
the least known countries in the world” (Fegley 1991:xiii). Indeed, Cronje (1976:5) 
notes that, “few people outside Africa have heard of Equatorial Guinea. Those who 
have, vaguely  recall that some notoriety  attaches to it, but they tend to confuse 
Equatorial Guinea with the Republic of Guinea, a former French colony which is also 
known as Guinea-Conakry, to differentiate it from its newly independent neighbour, 
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Guinea-Bissau.” Roberts (2006:18) describes its location as in “the armpit of Africa, a 
small patch of land divided between a square of mainland territory  and a scattering of 
islands in the Gulf of Guinea” (see Map 1).
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3.2.1 The Geography of Equatorial Guinea
As can be seen in Map 1 Equatorial Guinea consists of the two islands in the Gulf of 
Guinea: Bioko (prior to independence known as Fernando Po and home to the capital, 
Malabo) and Annobón; and the mainland enclave of Río Muni—wedged between 
Cameroon to the north and Gabon to the south (Fegley 1991:xv). Indeed, Sundiata 
(1983:82) notes that, “like most present-day  African countries, Equatorial Guinea was 
born of colonial partitioning. For most of the past century, the Spanish presence was, 
at best, superficial.” Moreover, the different parts of the country  experienced different 
levels of colonial encroachment. For example, “on the island [Fernando Po], the 
Spanish allowed some of the indigenous Bubi to establish themselves in the 
professions or enter Spanish employment. Few such benefits were extended to the 
populations of the mainland. This neglect enabled the people of Rio Muni to remain 
more immune to the cultural imperialism of the metropole” (Sundiata 1983:82-83). 
One of the biggest issues that  has faced Equatorial Guinea since colonial times is that 
it is “composed of two very different parts” (Yates 2012:90) and as a result Clarke 
(2010:136) suggests that it is “a fragmented state in all senses.” It will become 
apparent that such a history  and geography has provided ripe conditions for a system 
of neo-patrimonialism to become established.
3.2.2 The Colonial History of Equatorial Guinea
A central explanation for the course that Equatorial Guinea has followed since 
independence, is that it was a Spanish colony: the country’s only  African possession. 
Roberts (2006:19) explains how, “for two centuries Spain owned the territory, but 
showed almost no interest in its only tropical African possession.” Moreover, “the 
Victorian explorer Henry  Morton Stanley called Fernando Po a ‘pearl in the Gulf of 
Guinea’, but added he would not give a penny for a ‘jewel which Spain did not 
polish’” (Roberts 2006:19). Zeleza and Eyoh (2003:201) explain that “Equatorial 
Guinea’s history in the twentieth century was strongly defined by its encounter with 
imperialism and colonialism.” Similarly, Wornoff (1988:vii) argues that part of the 
reason for such obscurity  surrounding Equatorial Guinea is “its origin in the more 
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restricted and less penetrable colonial empire of Spain.” Fegley (1989:16) believes 
that, “the Spanish were the least successful imperial power in equatorial Africa.” Such 
arguments are supported by Ghazvinian (2007:170-71) who notes that:
  
 The peculiar trajectory of Equatorial Guinea’s history can best be understood 
 in the context  of its status as the only former Spanish colony in sub-Saharan 
 Africa [...] because virtually  all African countries function under educational, 
 political and legal systems similar to those bequeathed to them by the former 
 colonial powers, a strong institutional divide exists  between the Anglophone 
 and Francophone blocs [...] Scraped together from the territories of 
 Spanish Guinea and given independence (almost by  accident) in 1968, 
 Equatorial Guinea has never been able to tap in fully to a larger community  of 
 African states, and has remained on the fringes of the continent’s politics.
Undoubtedly, it is the fact that Equatorial Guinea holds a unique colonial history on 
the African continent that partly accounts for the lack of knowledge and resultant 
interest surrounding it. Its small size and relative obscurity has allowed for its 
chequered and troubled history to be largely ignored; virtually unnoticed. This was 
not always the case, however. Cronje (1976:7) describes how, “the obscurity  which 
surrounds Equatorial Guinea is quite recent. Its island province off the West African 
coast, Fernando Po, was discovered by the Portuguese in 1472 and aptly  named 
‘Formosa’ — the beautiful. Three hundred years later Portugal exchanged the island 
with Spain for large tracts of land in South America, an important part of what is now 
Brazil.” She continues by describing how:
 In 1858 Madrid appointed the first Governor General for Fernando Po, and 
 Spanish colonial rule started in earnest. Nevertheless, Spanish settlement was 
 initially slow [...] It was only towards the end of the century that Spanish 
 interest in Fernando Po became more active. There had been an increase in the 
 world demand for cocoa, and the island’s proven suitability for growing the 
 crop attracted the attention of Spanish planters (Cronje 1976:7).
Similarly, Sundiata (1990:32) notes that, “although colonial penetration was slow, the 
almost nonexistent  Spanish presence of the nineteenth century  was replaced by a 
growing number of Europeans [...] In 1868 the European presence was one of the 
strongest in equatorial Africa with relation to the indigenous population.” It was, 
however, the case that, “until well into the twentieth century, much of the population 
remained beyond the influence of control [... and] Spanish control was even more 
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tenuous on the mainland. In the early  1920s colonial authority  was still 
unestablished” (Sundiata 1990:33). On the whole, Artucio (1979:3) argues that, 
“colonial policies brought great misfortune to the country.” Conversely, Clarke 
(2010:137) suggests that, “despite earlier neglect, Spain put major effort  into 
development in the 1960s.” Likewise, Wornoff (1988:vii) argues that  Equatorial 
Guinea was, “far from poorly endowed upon independence in 1968 and showed signs 
of joining the African community as a reasonably prosperous and successful 
member.” Such a positive outlook was, however, according to Clarke (2010:137) 
“before Macias took the helm.” This chapter will proceed by looking at the legacy of 
Spanish colonialism (up to independence in 1968), before examining the eleven years 
of Macías Nguema’s rule (from 1968-1979) in the context of how these events 
fostered a system of neo-patrimonialism.
3.3 THE SPANISH COLONIAL LEGACY
As has already been established in the preceding section, the legacy of Spanish 
colonialism in Equatorial Guinea can be seen as a central explanation for how and 
why a system of neo-patrimonialism has taken root  in the country  since independence. 
The following section will detail the principal aspects of colonial rule that laid the 
conditions for neo-patrimonialism being so easily  established following independence 
from Spain in 1968 and how Equatorial Guinea could decline so rapidly from having 
a promising future at  independence (Clarke 2010; Wornoff 1988) to sinking into a 
“morass of murder and mayhem” over the course of only a few years (Meredith 
2006:239). The four main aspects which will be focused upon are: (1) unequal 
colonisation and development; (2) Spanish paternalism; (3) rapid decolonisation and; 
(4) Spanish fascism at home. It  is to these aspects and how these allowed the system 
of neo-patrimonialism to take root and develop that we now turn our attention.
3.3.1 Unequal colonisation and development
The previous section on the geography and history of Equatorial Guinea has touched 
upon this detrimental aspect  of Spanish colonialism. The geographical layout of the 
state; combining the different territories of the mainland enclave of Río Muni and the 
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two islands of Fernando Po and Annobón meant that there was a lack of unity 
between the island and interior communities and (as with many other African states) 
Equatorial Guinea (or Spanish Guinea as it was then known) was born simply through 
colonial partitioning and treaty negotiations between different colonial powers, with 
little regard for the inhabitants of these territories. Indeed, Sundiata (1983:82) notes 
that: 
!
! While nominally ruled by Madrid since the end of the 1700s, the island 
 portion of the  republic (formerly Fernando Po) was not entirely  explored by 
 Europeans before 1900. The  bulk of the coast of Rio Muni was claimed by 
 France until the 1900 Treaty  of Paris, which conceded it to Spain. Although 
 the Paris treaty established the frontiers of Spanish Rio Muni and an 
 administration was organized in 1904, most of the territory  remained 
 unexplored by the Spanish until the 1920s.
As a result of such a discrepancy in the level of colonial encroachment, differing 
levels and extents of development were experienced in the different territories. The 
islanders of Fernando Po much more used to European presence than those occupying 
the mainland territory. Indeed, Sundiata (1983:82-83) describes how, “under 
colonialism, the various ethnic groups in Spanish Guinea fared differently. On the 
island, the Spanish allowed some of the indigenous Bubi to establish themselves in 
the professions or enter Spanish employment. Few such benefits were extended to the 
populations of the mainland. This neglect enabled the people of the Rio Muni to 
remain more immune to the cultural imperialism of the metropole.” Indeed, Fegley 
(1989:28) argues that “development under Spanish rule was purposely  unequal.” He 
describes how “by the end of World War II, Santa Isabel [modern day Malabo] had 
become a city of importance [...] Almost  half of Fernando Po’s residents lived in 
Santa Isabel, where schools, hospitals and markets insured a prosperous and secure 
life for all who co-operated with the Europeans. Far from being ‘death’s waiting 
room’, the city had become a place of sophistication and comfort.” By contrast, “Río 
Muni was very  different. It had the atmosphere of a frontier town [...] the attitude of 
the administration was such that the Fang [the dominant ethnic group on the 
mainland] were isolated from those other Africans who could have aided them in 
adapting to the new world being [...] Furthermore, few Fang were ever able to gain 
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access to Spanish patronage and those few who did seldom left the mainland” (Fegley 
1989:28). As a result, Fegley (1989:28) explains that “the economies and societies of 
the mainland and the island were diverging both in terms of structure and 
complexity.” It  was this colonial policy of divide-and-rule that can be seen as a key 
element in the development of neo-patrimonialism after independence in 1968. This is 
because there was an existing system of patronage which was enacted by  the Spanish 
to distribute largesse to those favoured by  the colonial administration—largely  the 
Bubi on Fernando Po. Additionally, the distinctions between the different ethnic 
groups (the Bubi and Fernandinos on Fernando Po and the Fang of Río Muni) were 
heightened, with the Bubi being granted employment and assimilation whilst the Fang 
of the mainland were largely  left untouched. Such a system instilled an ethnic-centric 
system of patrimonialism. As will be seen in the following section on the rule of 
Macías Nguema, following independence the Fang were the favoured group due to 
their dominance and being the ethnic group  from which the president came. This 
resulted in neo-patrimonialism being enacted along ethnic and clan lines. In sum, 
since colonialism there had been a system in Equatorial Guinea of the ‘haves’ and the 
‘have-nots’; such a system was only  further entrenched when the bitter Macías came 
to power, wanting revenge for the neglect suffered under Spanish colonialism. As 
such, it can be seen that Bratton and van de Walle’s (1994:459) observation that 
“personal relationships [...] constitute the foundation and superstructure of political 
institutions” and that “the interaction between the ‘big man’ and his extended retinue” 
was beginning to be seen in Equatorial Guinea, even under the Spanish colonial 
administration. Such a system was merely entrenched and made more extreme under 
Macías Nguema.
Two further reasons for the Spanish choosing to develop Equatorial Guinea to 
differing extents was due to the main economic activity being the production of cocoa 
(largely on Fernando Po) and the administration’s desire to keep the territories’ 
inhabitants separate for political reasons. Cronje (1976:9) describes how, “at 
independence, 90 per cent of Equatorial Guinea’s cocoa was produced on Fernando 
Po [...] The 250,000-strong mainland population, three-quarters of them Fang, 
therefore had no opportunity of being caught up in the Spanish patronage network.” It 
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should be remembered that neo-patrimonialism is not enacted for altruistic reasons of 
giving away financial and other material rewards, but rather to ensure support and 
obedience to the ‘big man’. Whilst neo-patrimonialism is widely regarded as being a 
post-independence phenomenon, it’s earlier incarnation as patronage networks were a 
key aspect of colonial regimes and Spanish Guinea was no different to Anglophone, 
Francophone or Lusophone colonial systems in this way. Spain favoured the island of 
Fernando Po over the mainland Río Muni due to the economic prosperity afforded by 
it through cocoa production, and therefore centred its patronage network there. There 
were, of course, positives and negatives to such a policy. Cronje (1976:9) notes that 
this policy meant that, “the people of Rio Muni retained their independence.” This in 
turn was problematic for the Spanish administration as, “being on the mainland, they 
were also far more open to the African nationalist influences which swept through the 
French, Belgian and British colonies after World War II.” As a result, “the majority of 
the Fang in Rio Muni, who had been infected with the more militant nationalism of 
alar ayong, were impatient with Spain’s continued colonial presence” (Cronje 
1976:10). Consequently, the Spanish were reluctant to employ  the Fang on the cocoa 
plantations on Fernando Po as “they did not want to import Fang nationalism into 
Fernando Po for obvious political reasons. By  contrast with the mainland, nationalism 
was slow to take root on the island” (Cronje 1976:11). This enforced difference in the 
treatment of the ethnic groups only  fostered the conditions that would allow for such a 
system to become entrenched following independence. The Spanish authorities’ 
favouring of the Bubi and Fernandinos of Fernando Po over the Fang of Río Muni 
only served to foster anti-Spanish sentiment on the mainland with calls for Spanish 
withdrawal; this was in contrast to the desire to remain tied to Spain under the 
colonial system voiced by the population of Fernando Po. As will be seen in the 
following sections, such a difference in sentiment towards the colonial administration 
meant that the success of independence was always in doubt. In sum, the unequal 
colonisation and development undertaken by the Spanish colonial administration 
meant that conditions were ripe at independence for a system of neo-patrimonialism 
(which is unequal by its very nature) to take root and develop.
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3.3.2 Spanish paternalism
Tied to the unequal colonisation and development of Equatorial Guinea was a central 
colonial policy of paternalism that the Spanish relied upon to keep control. Under this 
system the Bubi and Fernandinos of Fernando Po were favoured for positions of 
responsibility by  the Spanish, whereas the Fang of the mainland had their movements 
restricted and were repressed. Fegley  (1991:xliv) explains that, “Spanish paternalism 
had caused untold confusion in the minds of those Africans whose value systems were 
being transformed. Such attitudes gave rise to inferiority complexes, fixations on 
Spanish things and undirected resentments toward foreigners. The country was left 
with severe economic and social cleavages.” Again, as will be seen in the following 
section on the tenure of Macías Nguema, such a policy only  gave rise to further 
resentment following independence and contributed to the development of a neo-
patrimonial system that came to dominate Equatorial Guinea. Indeed, Yates (2012:92) 
describes how “laws, tribunals, and prisons were conceived to exclude the indigenous 
populations from any posts of responsibility.” This was particularly the case for the 
Fang of the mainland territory of Río Muni who were believed to be “unsuited for 
employment on ‘civilized’ estates” (Cronje 1976:10). In contrast, Yates (2012:92-93) 
explains that, “because the island capital had been the focus of almost all Spanish 
assimilation, the Bubi had enjoyed a relatively  privileged status during the late 
colonial period. This changed after decolonization. The formerly unprivileged Fang, 
by virtue of their numerical preponderance, assumed political power, and thereafter 
tyrannized the smaller ethnic minorities who inhabited the islands.” It was this neglect 
of the Fang (the ethnic group of Macías Nguema) that can be attributed to the later 
privileged position that the group enjoyed under the neo-patrimonial system 
established by Macías Nguema and the abandonment and abuse suffered by the other 
ethnic groups: most notably the Bubi. Indeed, Fegley (1989:28) argues that “the 
paternalism of colonial authorities, plantation owners and priests often clouded the 
country’s real issues.”
It was the Patronato de Indígenas or Native Patronage Organisation, according to 
Fegley  (1989:30), that was “the most important institution of colonial rule in Spanish 
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Guinea.” Its was originally created with the sole purpose of protecting the Bubi. 
Although a non-governmental organisation, Fegley  (1989:30) describes how it 
“became almost a government unto itself.” Indeed, “it controlled the lives and futures 
of Spanish Guineans in ways that neither the trading firms nor the colonial officials 
were able to. No appeal could be made against it” (Fegley  1989:31). A key aspect of 
the Patronato was emancipation. This was a further way in which the Spanish 
colonial administration were able to enact divide-and-rule. It is also a central way in 
which inferiority complexes and anti-Spanish sentiment were generated which further 
fostered the neo-patrimonial system following independence. Fegley (1989:31) 
explains that  “the colonists divided the population into emancipados (assimilated 
citizens) and menores (minors, which included all regarded as primitives).” In fact, 
the Spanish did intend to assimilate all menores before independence, as “the 
authorities assumed that  to be Spanish was the highest goal a being could aspire 
to” (Fegley  1989:31). It  is perhaps unsurprising that the majority  of the menores were 
Fang. Fegley (1989:31) explains how, “emancipation was granted to natives with 
higher education, with salaries over 500 pesetas a year or with posts in the civil 
service. These restrictions meant that virtually all Fernandinos, many  Bubis and 
Ndowe and almost no Fang were emancipated before the Second World War.” As a 
result of such a policy, Decalo (1998:58) views Spanish colonialism in Equatorial 
Guinea as being “oppressive, culturally  paternalistic, and suffused with puritanism 
and middle-class value-biases.” Moreover, he describes how “commencing in 1904, 
the legal code of the territory  was based on the patronato de indigenas (‘patronage of 
the natives’), which made the indigenous population virtual legal minors who could 
neither sell their lands nor conduct commercial transactions of more than 2,000 
pesetas in value. Subject to customary law, rather than to the Spanish colonial code, 
they  were also forced to undertake onerous corve labor on European cocoa plantations 
in partial payment of their annual taxes” (Decalo 1998:58-59). As such, those holding 
menores status were little more than slaves to the colonial administration. It  is 
therefore unsurprising that in the run-up to independence there was increasing anti-
Spanish sentiment displayed by the Fang in particular and that a neo-patrimonial 
system was created by Macías Nguema in favour of his Fang kinsmen to redistribute 
the favours that passed them by under Spanish colonialism. Consequently, it  is clear 
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to see that the system of Spanish paternalism was a particularly  damaging aspect of 
their colonial administration. It served to breed deep-rooted resentments which would 
continue to play out following independence from Spain in 1968. 
3.3.3 Rapid decolonisation
As with a significant number of other former colonies on the African continent, the 
process of decolonisation in Equatorial Guinea happened relatively  quickly. As a 
result, the transition to independence and the assumed democracy that came with it 
was far from seamless. A central reason for this was the lack of a clear national 
identity  and poor institutions which had not been fully  developed. Steele (2005a:486) 
explains that, “although the constitutional road to independence had taken only  eight 
years, it  had started from scratch after many years of political repression, and the roots 
of the new representative institutions were correspondingly  shallow.” It  is therefore 
unsurprising that neo-patrimonialism took root so quickly after independence. After 
all, as Leftwich (2008:214) makes clear, “it was the development of institutions of 
rule and governing which were formally separated from not just the rulers but the 
officials who ran them, on the one hand, and the citizenry, on the other hand, that was 
central in the shift from what Weber called ‘traditional’ forms of rule and authority, 
including patrimonial politics, to the modern state.” Therefore, if such institutions 
were not fully developed at independence, it is not difficult to see how a shift back 
towards the traditional authority of patrimonialism was able to happen. Indeed, it  is 
possible to see what happened in Equatorial Guinea as a clear example of Chabal and 
Daloz’s (1999:14) theory  of the state as a relatively empty shell. They  describe how 
the state is “vacuous in that it did not consolidate, as was expected, on the foundations 
of the colonial legacy but instead rapidly  disintegrated and fell prey to particularistic 
and factional struggles. It became an empty shell. As a result it failed to acquire either 
legitimacy  or the professional competence which are the hallmarks of the modern 
state.” Moreover, Fegley (1991:xliv) argues that  Equatorial Guinea’s political system 
was “needlessly complicated for a nation of its size.” As a result, it was perhaps 
foreseeable that independence was likely to prove problematic.
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Although movement towards making Equatorial Guinea independent began as a result 
of the ‘winds of change’ that blew across the African continent following the end of 
World War II, there was a lack of a grassroots nationalist movement (Steele, 2005b:
486). This is a point supported by Decalo (1998:67) who notes that, “despite the great 
degree of fission and fusion in the political scene, a unified nationalist movement 
never emerged in Equatorial Guinea. The deep  schism between the two territorial 
segments of the colony triggered completely  different and mutually antagonistic 
popular responses to the process of decolonization.” There was, however, Sundiata 
(1983:83) explains, “increasing pressure from nationalist exiles in neighboring Gabon 
and Cameroon, and from the United Nations” which called for liberalisation, and “in 
August 1963, Spain announced its intention of giving the two provinces of Spanish 
Guinea greater autonomy.” Although the period of autonomy from 1963-68 was seen 
as a positive move by Spain, “international opinion, especially  within the United 
Nations, demanded a quickened pace for Spanish decolonization [...] the inhabitants 
of Spanish Guinea wanted and should have independence no later than 
1968” (Sundiata 1983:84). Fegley (1989:41) explains that “respectability  became a 
necessity if Madrid was to live down fascism. Furthermore, the Spanish needed to pay 
at least  lip  service to decolonization if they  were ever to retrieve Gibraltar from the 
British.” Therefore, Spain agreed to grant independence to Equatorial Guinea in 1968, 
after a period of ‘provincialisation’. Fegley (1989:44) describes how:
 
 ‘Provincialization’ gave a new dimension to the differences between the 
 largely Westernized island and the less developed mainland. Officially, 
 Spanish Guinea was divided  into two provinces. This could be interpreted as 
 being one or two colonies. The two had certainly developed separately. Indeed, 
 many  Europeans and Africans argued over their status. Many islanders, 
 particularly the Bubi, doubted the wisdom of independence. Few of them were 
 to join the ranks of nationalists. Many of the anti-colonial movement which 
 were being formed had a distinctly Fang character.
Indeed, as has already been alluded to, it  was the lack of care taken by Spain to solve 
the divergent and unequal nature of the two territories within Equatorial Guinea that 
would, after independence, prove problematic and help to foster the divided nature of 
the state that would enable neo-patrimonialism to develop so successfully. Fegley 
(1989:44) succinctly  describes how, “by  1960 a colony of two clearly different parts, 
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culturally, economically and politically, had evolved. Paradoxically, Fernando Po, one 
of the first places in Africa to see European penetration, was paired with Río Muni, 
probably  the last area on the continent to be fully explored.” The lack of time and 
energy expended by the Spanish colonial authorities to bridge these differences; 
instead giving the impression that they had cut-and-run has had a lasting and deeply 
detrimental impact on Equatorial Guinea, and is a central cause of the resentment that 
helped to fuel the neo-patrimonial network that  Macías Nguema developed following 
independence in 1968. 
The detrimental extent of the rapid decolonisation process is perhaps best illustrated 
through the events of the Constitutional Conference convened by Spain to decide the 
devolution of power in October 1967. Decalo (1998:69-70) describes how:
 In October 1967, under increasing pressure at the United Nations over its 
 delaying tactics, Spain convened a Constitutional Conference in Madrid to 
 determine the nature of the ultimate devolution of power. Invited to the 
 conference were representatives of all the parties in Equatorial Guinea, 
 including recently formed separationist factions in Fernando Poo. The 
 conference was a stormy and acrimonious one. All the territory’s internal 
 divisions—ethnic, regional, and personal—again came dearly  into the open. 
 Utterly deadlocked on all basic issues, the conference had to be adjourned. As 
 one Hispano-Guinean forcefully argued during the session ‘Equatorial Guinea 
 does not [exist] except on paper; it is an artificial creation, in reality two 
 territories.
Such a display suggested, to even a casual observer, that Equatorial Guinea was not 
fully  prepared to be granted independence and therefore the success of such a move 
could already have been questioned at this time. Moreover, Artucio (1979:4) notes 
that when the Constitution was eventually agreed upon and drawn up, it was a 
“progressive, democratic, Western-style Constitution. As a matter of fact, compared 
with the Constitution then in effect in Spain, it is far more advanced.” The suitability 
of (fascist) Spain introducing democracy to one of its dependencies will be examined 
more closely in the next section, but it is clear that the Constitution was not 
necessarily suitable to a state in the embryonic stages of ‘democracy’, and therefore 
the fact that it quickly  failed and was hijacked by Macías Nguema to be replaced by 
his own ‘personalised’ Constitution is again unsurprising. 
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The system of patronato de indigenas detailed in the preceding section also 
emphasises the unsuitability for the rapid speed at which decolonisation was enacted. 
By excluding the indigenous peoples from positions of responsibility  and authority for 
so long, it meant that when the time came for them to take up such positions they  did 
not have the qualifications or experience. It is therefore par for the course that 
institutionalisation would not be successfully developed, because there was a lack of 
experience and preparation achieved by those newly-promoted to positions of 
responsibility. Such a situation was only  made worse by  the election of Macías 
Nguema and his expelling and destruction of the Spanish and Equatorial Guinean 
intellectuals, as will be further explored later in this chapter. Indeed, Chabal and 
Daloz’s (1999) ‘political instrumentalization of disorder’ should be kept in mind. This 
is the idea that the state is “ineffectual in that it has never been in the interest of 
African political elites to work for the proper institutionalization of the state 
apparatus. Or to put it another way, its usefulness is greatest when it is least 
institutionalized” (Chabal and Daloz 1999:14). The lack of development and 
institutionalisation of the bureaucracy and judiciary in particular was seized upon by 
Macías Nguema to be adapted to serve his own purposes of self-enrichment and 
support through a neo-patrimonial network, as will be explored in more detail later. 
This was one of several elements that indicated that the rapid speed with which 
decolonisation was enacted in Equatorial Guinea was detrimental to the success of 
independence. Furthermore, it provided the conditions that allowed a system of neo-
patrimonialism to take root and develop as the weakness of institutions is a key factor 
for the success of such a network being established. 
3.3.4 Spanish fascism at home
As has already been alluded to earlier in this chapter, a further element of the Spanish 
colonial legacy that contributed to the conditions that allowed a system of neo-
patrimonialism to develop  in Equatorial Guinea following independence, was the 
fascist nature of the Franco regime in Spain that oversaw its colonies, including 
Equatorial Guinea. Ghazvinian (2007:171) believes that a central reason for the 
course that Equatorial Guinea took following independence, in particular the highly-
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personalised regime of Macías Nguema, was because of the political regime that the 
state had been exposed to by its colonial master. “Perhaps most important, Equatorial 
Guinea’s independence came when Spain was still an international pariah ruled by 
Generalissimo Francisco Franco and his fascist Falange party. For years, the only 
European political philosophy to which the territory’s elites and civil servants had 
been exposed was authoritarianism.” Moreover, Decalo (1998:58) notes that “among 
all the modern colonizations in Africa, it  appears that one can give the Spaniards the 
record for police vigilance, even if there are other serious contenders in this domain.” 
It is therefore understandable that a highly personalised regime based on corruption 
and terror came to dominate in Equatorial Guinea under Macías Nguema for the first 
eleven years post-independence. Roberts (2006:19) also sees the Franco regime as 
being responsible for the failure of democracy  and institutionalisation and the 
resultant rise of neo-patrimonialism; in part because of rapid decolonisation: “When 
independence loomed, the Spanish organised hasty polls to find a new government. 
Spain, under its own dictator General Franco, was hardly qualified to promote 
democracy  and Equatorial Guinea was ill-prepared when, later in 1968, it became the 
126th member of the United Nations.” Such an opinion is shared by  Steele (2005b:
486) who notes how, “the comparatively  rapid advance of Equatorial Guinea [...] to 
independence, after many years of authoritarian rule under Franco’s Spain [...] 
facilitated the emergence of a leader, Francisco Macías Nguema [...] whose record of 
repression and violations of basic human rights was matched only  by  those of Idi 
Amin and the “emperor” Bokassa.” Indeed, the fact that its colonial master was not a 
democracy  itself, meant that the chances of democracy taking root and developing 
successfully  in Equatorial Guinea was in doubt from inception. This is a point which 
is supported by Sundiata (1990:55): 
 
 Spain [...] envisioned the creation of a new government more democratic than 
 the metropolitan regime [...] In retrospect, much of the constitution-making of 
 the 1960s appears to have been an exercise in futility. The hastily conceived 
 constitution was alien to the  colonial power that retired from Equatorial 
 Guinea in 1968. It was equally  alien to the  political realities that governed the 
 lives of the majority of the new nation’s citizens.
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It is therefore unsurprising that Macías Nguema so easily managed to abolish it  and 
introduce his neo-patrimonial system dominated by personal rule and terror 
campaigns. The repression enacted on Equatorial Guinea under the colonial rule of 
Franco’s Spain had a lasting effect on the politics of the state after independence. 
Having only  known authoritarian rule, characterised by a strict terror network, it  is not 
particularly shocking that such a regime would be emulated by Macías Nguema when 
he came to power in 1968: it is to his terror-dominated rule that our attention now 
turns.
3.4 THE MADNESS  OF MACÍAS: THE RULE OF MACÍAS NGUEMA 
1968-1979
Equatorial Guinea became an independent state on 12 October 1968. Finally  shedding 
its colonial shackles, there were great  hopes of a prosperous future. Fegley 
(1991:xliii) notes that “Fernando Po’s per capita GNP was US$466, by far the highest 
in black Africa. Río Muni was not nearly  as prosperous. Nevertheless, the per capita 
GNP for the entire country climbed to US$300 by independence. The literacy  rate was 
89% and energy consumption was the fourth highest in black Africa. In 1960 the 
colony’s per capita export index was the highest in Africa at US$135 (Ghana’s was 
$48 and South Africa’s $87).” These figures are impressive, particularly when the 
comparatively  small land area and population of Equatorial Guinea is considered. 
Similarly, Clarke (2010:137) explains that, “despite earlier neglect, Spain put major 
effort into development in the 1960s.” Although, the statistics suggest that Equatorial 
Guinea was indeed on the brink of prosperity, Clarke (2010:137) stresses that “all of 
this was before Macias took the helm.” Moreover, the detrimental impact that Macías 
Nguema had on the newly-independent Equatorial Guinea and the rapidity with which 
any hopes were dashed is hinted at by  Ghazvinian (2007:171): “Franco, hoping to 
demonstrate his bona fides to the world, ensured that a free and fair election took 
place in Malabo, the only  democratic election he ever organized. There was only one 
problem: The wrong man won.” 
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Francisco Macías Nguema was born in 1924 in Mongomo, on the mainland. A 
member of the Fang and the son of a witch doctor; it will become apparent that these 
small facts had a central bearing on how Macías behaved once he was elected as 
President in 1968. Ghazvinian (2007:171) describes how Nguema, “a former court 
translator, a paranoid schizophrenic sociopath, and the uncle of Equatorial Guinea’s 
current president, quickly declared himself ‘President for Life’ and, for good measure, 
‘Immaculate Apostle of Steel’ and ‘Unique Miracle of Equatorial Guinea,’ among 
other titles. The cinematic depravity  of his regime was rivaled only  by the likes of 
Uganda’s Idi Amin.” The only  miracle that could really  be associated with Macías is 
that Equatorial Guinea still existed at the end of his tenure; although only just. 
Roberts (2006:20) details how, “after independence things really went wrong. Its 
citizens were soon desperate to escape.” He continues by noting that, “Macias’ reign 
was tragi-comic — and sadly typical of the worst of African leaders. He seemed to 
compete with Idi Amin of Uganda in acts of bizarre brutality.” The disastrous effect of 
Macías Nguema’s rule in Equatorial Guinea is summed up by Meredith (2006:238-39) 
when he describes how, “Equatorial Guinea enjoyed only 145 days of independence 
before it  was pitched into a nightmare of brutality  and coercion that lasted for eleven 
years [...] Equatorial Guinea steadily sank into a morass of murder and mayhem.” It is 
undeniable that Macías Nguema had a detrimental effect on the newly-independent 
Equatorial Guinea during his eleven years in power. This section will detail the key 
aspects of his presidency and how they  illustrate and contributed towards the 
development of the system of neo-patrimonialism that has come to characterise 
politics in Equatorial Guinea since independence. These central features are: (1) 
Macías’ inferiority complex and anti-Spanish sentiment; (2) the personalisation of 
power and plunder of state resources and; (3) Macías’ terror campaign and mental (in)
capacity. It is to these aspects that our attention will now be focused.
3.4.1 Macías’ inferiority complex and anti-Spanish sentiment
As has been briefly  commented upon in the preceding sections, the Spanish colonial 
policies which favoured the Bubi and Fernandino ethnic groups of Fernando Po over 
the Fang of Río Muni helped to instil an inferiority complex in the Fang; no more so 
than in the newly-elected president, Macías Nguema. Under colonial rule, Macías had 
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been rapidly  promoted (many believed far beyond his intellectual capabilities) and 
Fegley  (1989:49) notes that, “he was highly regarded by the colonialists and his 
rewards were correspondingly high.” Furthermore, Fegley (1989:57) describes how 
upon his being elected, “the Spanish undoubtedly felt comfortable with Macías, even 
if he wasn’t their first choice. Remembering his past, they saw him as an easy target 
for future influence. Little did they know of the xenophobia and megalomania which 
had built up in their little interpreter from Mongomo.” The lasting effect that the 
Spanish treatment had on the Fang was to, in turn, have a lasting effect on Equatorial 
Guinea as a whole. Meredith (2006:239) details the detrimental impact that the 
Spanish policy had on Macías: 
 
 A politician of limited education and low mental ability, Nguema had made his 
 way up the ladder as a result of the support of Spanish administrators who 
 believed he could be turned into a trustworthy  collaborator relied upon to do 
 their bidding [...] But while being groomed  for office by  the Spanish, Nguema 
 harboured intense resentments against them and an  abiding hatred of foreign 
 culture and ‘intellectuals’ in general. Once in power, he lashed out.
 
It soon became apparent after he came to power, that  Macías resented the Spanish and 
those ethnic groups that had gained preferential treatment under the colonial 
administration; notably the Bubi and Fernandinos of Fernando Po. As a result he 
embarked on a campaign to bolster the Fang to the majority  of positions of authority 
and personalise power with a close ring of kinsmen around him. This, a key  element 
in the development of neo-patrimonialism, will be looked at in closer detail in the 
next section. Roberts (2006:22) describes how, “Macias — like Pol Pot in Cambodia 
— launched a campaign against the educated and they began to ‘disappear’. He 
banned the word ‘intellectual’, once firing a minister who used it at a cabinet meeting. 
He called educated people the ‘greatest  problem facing Africa today. They are 
polluting our climate with foreign culture’.” Similarly, Human Rights Watch (2009:7) 
describes the Macías regime as being “virulently  anti-intellectual.” Fegley (1989:69) 
highlights the point  that, “the elimination of opponents and sometimes even large 
sections of the educated elite was not unknown in Africa. However, the difference 
between Macías’s reign of terror and what happened in, for example, Bokassa’s 
Central African Empire was the totality of the program.” Indeed, as will become 
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apparent in the sections on Macías’ personalisation of power and the terror campaign 
that came with it, once Macías had eliminated his Spanish and non-Fang ‘opponents’ 
his terror and murder net was simply thrown wider until only  a small ring of 
henchmen surrounded him in the dying days of his regime. 
What needs to be considered is that under a system of neo-patrimonialism, power is 
seen as zero sum. Therefore, no competition or opponents can be tolerated. Bavister-
Gould (2011:1-2) highlights two particular elements that are seen by proponents of 
such a regime. These are: a ruthless application of coercion and repression to gain and 
especially maintain power and; the use of often considerable brutality and exclusion 
as the means for punishing opponents and competitors. Macías Nguema was quick to 
employ such methods to ensure that his presidency went unchallenged and as will be 
seen through the remainder of this chapter, as he became more and more desperate to 
cling to power, the methods that  he and his security apparatus employed became more 
and more brutal. Zeleza and Eyoh (2003:202) note that in 1969, soon after gaining 
power, Macías Nguema “banned opposition parties, constrained the free press, and 
forced out most of the 7,000-strong Spanish community.” Fegley  (1991:xlv) describes 
how, “in a series of violent speeches at the beginning of 1969, the President 
encouraged anti-Spanish feelings. He demanded the number of flags flying over 
Spanish diplomatic missions in the country should be reduced. The Spanish 
ambassador refused.” The events that followed led to what Cronje (1976:22) 
described as “a mass exodus of Spaniards.” Similarly, Arnold (2005:371) notes that 
“anti-white demonstrations and incidents led to an exodus of Spanish residents and 
this, in turn, led to a near collapse of the economy.” The extent and severity of events 
is summarised by Sundiata (1983:88) who explains that Fang nationalism and 
Macías’ “obviously unfolding designs of personal rule” meant that  opposition 
elements (most notably Spaniards and Bubis) needed to be eliminated:
 Barely four months after independence, which had been superficially  smooth, 
 a grave crisis  arose that signaled the total removal of all the obstacles in 
 Macias’s way. To counter the Bubi-Spanish alliance, Macias had brought over 
 some 7000 Fang to the capital Santa Isabel (the present Malabo).He demanded 
 that Spain remove its remaining garrisons from the new state and persisted in 
 anti-Spanish speeches. While an exodus of Spaniards began, Foreign 
46
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 Minister Atanasio Ndongo and the Equatorian delegate to the United Nations, 
 Saturino Ibongo, were asked by Spanish officials to stop inflammatory 
 broadcasts. After Macias refused to heed them, the two attempted a coup. 
 Ndongo briefly took over the presidency, but was soon routed. He and Ibongo 
 were captured. The followers of the ill-fated putsch fled to the forest, while the 
 president ordered the arrest of a number of political leaders.
Such events heralded a quickening of Macías Nguema’s personalisation of power. 
Determined to eliminate all opposition to his rule, and having expelled all Spaniards 
and other foreign influences, he focused on transforming the political structures of 
Equatorial Guinea into his family  business, to carry  out his personal wishes and 
entrench his planned system of neo-patrimonialism. It is these events that the next 
section will be concerned with.
3.4.2 The personalisation of power and plunder of state resources
According to Bratton and van de Walle (1997:62), “the right to rule in neopatrimonial 
regimes is ascribed to a person rather than to an office, despite the official existence 
of a written constitution. One individual [...] often a president for life, dominates the 
state apparatus and stands above its laws.” Such a situation is what became apparent 
in Equatorial Guinea as Macías Nguema sought to personalise power and surround 
himself with a close circle of trusted kinsmen: quickly the state began to be run as his 
personal fiefdom. Mengisteab (2008:42-43) argues that  along with Mobutu (Zaïre), 
Idi Amin (Uganda), Bokassa (Central African Republic), Mengistu (Ethiopia), Abacha 
(Nigeria) and Taylor (Liberia); Macías Nguema of Equatorial Guinea “essentially 
privatized the state and used its coffers as [... his] private bank account and its security 
forces as [...] private armies.” It was the archetypal ‘vampire’ state (Mengisteab 
2008:43). Indeed, the practice of politics under Macías Nguema fitted with the 
following description of neo-patrimonialism provided by Thomson (2010:110): 
“legal-rational institutions did not prosper in Africa after independence [...] Power 
was removed from civil society and peripheral institutions of the state, and hoarded 
instead within the core executive, often with just one individual being dominant.” As 
we shall see, this is an exemplary explanation of how politics came to be practiced in 
Equatorial Guinea under Macías Nguema. Indeed, Jackson and Rosberg (1982:246) 
note that, “it was reported upon assuming power, the Macías government installed 
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7,000 of its Fang supporters in government positions [...] Clearly  the new government 
was not to be a Guinean government so much as a Fang government.” As a result, 
Meredith (2006:240) reports that: “no proper administration survived. The only 
people to be paid regularly were the president, the army, the police and the militia. 
Most ministries — including those dealing with education, agriculture, construction 
and natural resources — had no budgets at all and their offices in Malabo were shut. 
The central bank too was closed after the director was publicly executed in 1976. All 
foreign exchange was delivered instead to Nguema who hoarded it  along with large 
amounts of local currency in his various palaces on Fernando Po and Rio Muni.” 
Roberts (2006:23) describes how, “when he ran short of money Macias took hostages 
[...] He collected a generous ransom of nearly $60,000 for a German woman [...] In 
1976 a Soviet plane crashed into a mountain near Malabo, killing all on board. Macias 
refused to release any  bodies until compensation of $5 million was paid for ‘damage 
to the mountain’.” Over the course of his eleven years in power, Equatorial Guinea 
went from a prosperous country, to one on the brink of disaster. According to 
Klitgaard (1991:20) “the reason for the horrible decline was the havoc wrought by the 
dictator Francisco Macías Nguema.” He continues by describing how:
 With Macías’s political sins had come economic decline. Some forty thousand 
 Nigerians, who labored on cocoa plantations on the island, left the country  in 
 1976 and 1977, after  increasingly  brutal treatment. Cocoa production dropped 
 from thirty thousand tons in the last years of Spanish rule to about five 
 thousand tons in the late 1970s. Coffee and timber  exports fell to less than a 
 tenth of their former levels (Klitgaard 1991:20).
Indeed, Woods (2004:548) argues that Macías Nguema alone can be blamed for the 
rapid and avoidable decline suffered by Equatorial Guinea in his eleven years in 
power following the granting of independence in 1968. He attributes the sorry state of 
affairs to Macías Nguema’s increasingly personalised rule and system of neo-
patrimonialism: 
 In March 1969, an abortive coup was alleged to have taken place. Macias used 
 this as an excuse to mount an extensive purge of both traditional leaders and 
 qualified cadres; all political parties were fused into a United National Party. 
 The constitution was suspended, with Macias assuming dictatorial powers. 
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 Macias neglected all functions of government other than internal security; 
 almost all formal education ground to a halt, with most of the population being 
 forced to revert to subsistence agriculture. The expulsion of most Nigerian 
 contract workers and Spanish expatriates led to a 90 percent drop in GNP. At 
 the close of his reign, one-third of the population had been killed or exiled.
It was the abandonment of the 1968 Constitution (devised at the pre-independence 
conference) by Macías Nguema and a new Constitution which introduced ever-
increasing presidential powers that served as the pinnacle of the personalisation of his 
power. Fegley (1991:xlvii) describes how, “as a result of the crises of March 1969, 
Macías declared that the 1968 Constitution had serious defects. He was able to 
completely sweep it away with a series of decrees. In May 1971, Legislative Decree 
no. 415 repealed a number of articles in the Constitution and promulgated a decree 
allowing the President to dissolve the Asamblea at his pleasure. Provisions relating to 
elections and the removal of the President from office were repealed and a council 
with purely advisory  functions was established.” Furthermore, Cronje (1976:14) notes 
that, “the next landmark in Macias’ drive for absolute power was reached on 14 July 
1972 when decree 1/72 proclaimed him President for Life, Head of the Nation and 
Party, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Grand Master of Education, Science and 
Culture.” With this legislation, Macías’ personalisation of power was complete and a 
system of neo-patrimonialism formally  established. Indeed, Fegley (1991:xlviii) 
explains that, “Macías gradually  assumed all legislative, executive, judicial and 
military powers. His ability to do this lay not only  in his own cunning, but also in the 
lack of any mass political consciousness within Equatorial Guinean society.” 
Similarly, Zeleza and Eyoh (2003:202) describe how Macías Nguema “initiated a 
regime whose brutality and megalomania rivaled that of Idi Amin in Uganda and 
Bokassa in the Central African Republic. Power was effectively controlled by 
Nguema, members of his immediate family, and kinfolk from his Esangui clan, and it 
was maintained through the officially  sanctioned murder of thousands of suspected 
opponents.” As will become clear in the following section on the terror network that 
Macías put in place, any  political consciousness that had been possessed by the 
populace was rapidly beaten out of it! 
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A further aspect of neo-patrimonial rule is the cultivation of a cult of personality and 
this is an unavoidably prominent aspect of Macías Nguema’s presidency. As has 
already been mentioned, Macías introduced increasingly imaginative, (comic), and 
excessive titles for himself—rivalling only  Idi Amin’s ‘Last King of Scotland’ and 
Jean-Bedel Bokassa’s ‘Emperor’. Zeleza and Eyoh (2003:202) explain that, 
“Equatorial Guinea’s post-independence history was defined by the mind-numbing 
tragic excesses of personal dictatorship.” Such excesses are described by  Shaxson, 
who declares that, “Equatorial Guinea fell under the spell of a poorly  educated man 
[...] a violent, stick-thin despot who descended into paranoid madness and called 
himself the Great Sorcerer, whom nobody could touch [...] An African Caligula, 
Macias proclaimed himself God’s ‘Unique Miracle’.” Before closing all Catholic 
churches, Macías Nguema insisted that Church services were dominated by his cult of 
personality rather than religious teachings. Sundiata (1983:93) details that:
 Macias sought not only  to disestablish the colonial religious order but to create 
 a new one centering on himself. The new ‘cult  of personality’ could contain 
 elements of the discredited colonial faith. The head of state was proclaimed 
 the ‘sole miracle’ of Equatorial Guinea. Church services were made to include 
 sycophantic adulation of the President for Life. Political rhetoric evoked the 
 image of the leader as a miraculous figure, eclipsing the discredited roster of 
 Roman Catholic saints.
Similarly, Human Rights Watch (2009:7) describes how: “the government claimed, 
‘There is no other God than Macías,’ and the phrase ‘God created Equatorial Guinea 
thanks to Macías—Without Macías Equatorial Guinea would not exist’ became a 
mandatory part of all church services.” Moreover, Roberts (2006:22) details that, “he 
[Macias] ordered teachers and priests to promote his cult  of personality. School 
children chanted that Macias alone had freed the country  from imperial Spanish rule. 
The sanctuary of every  church was to show his portrait. Priests read out messages 
venerating the insecure president.” The fact that the state still existed when Macías 
Nguema was deposed in a military-led coup d’état in 1979 is the only miracle of 
Equatorial Guinea! 
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3.4.3 Macias’ terror campaign and mental (in)capacity
Amnesty International labelled Equatorial Guinea under Macías Nguema as “an 
immense field of torture, from which the only exit is the cemetery” (quoted in 
Shaxson 2008:34). Pélissier (1980:13) describes how, “by the spring of 1979, 
Equatorial Guinea was rapidly plunging into a closeted nightmare that called to mind 
Cambodia minus political philosophy.” Moreover, Ghazvinian (2007:172) notes that, 
“during the Macias years, anywhere from one-third to one-half of Equatorial Guinea’s 
population either died or fled the country, as it became known in diplomatic circles as 
‘Africa’s concentration camp’.” Macías waged a campaign of terror for the duration 
of his presidency and as will be seen, it  was his ultimate downfall too, as his terror 
network eventually  turned in on itself. Roberts (2006:20) describes how, “a 
bloodthirsty and insecure tyrant, Macias assassinated ministers with zeal,” and 
“diplomats said Macias ruled through fear alone.” Indeed, the excessive terror 
network that Macías Nguema established was the only  way in which he could remain 
in power for as long as he did. Eventually there was no opposition left for Macías to 
eliminate, so he instead began to turn on his own henchmen: this was, ultimately, to 
lead to his own death. The preceding sections have briefly mentioned the violent 
repression that Macías Nguema came to rely on in order to keep control; this factor 
will now be examined in greater detail in order to show how it supported the growing 
neo-patrimonial system that Macías Nguema established in Equatorial Guinea. 
According to Jackson and Rosberg (1982:244):
 
 Two unequivocal cases of tyranny emerged in sub-Saharan Africa since 
 independence—in Equatorial Guinea and Uganda. In both, tyranny  grew out  
 of despotic situations in which power was used to persecute heretofore 
 privileged political minorities, but deteriorated quickly into general 
 oppressions in which seemingly no individual or group could feel  completely 
 safe. In both, eventually everyone became a candidate for victimization—even 
 collaborators or relatives of the rulers; for everyone—not least the ruler and 
 his agent— survival became a contingency  of life governed solely by power, 
 influence, or fortune. 
As has already  been mentioned, the use of coercion and repression along with 
brutality  and exclusion are central characteristics of ‘predatory’ rule according to 
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Bavister-Gould (2011:1-2). Such methods were characteristic of Macías Nguema’s 
presidency. Indeed, Jackson and Rosberg (1982:246) argue that “the crucial event in 
Equatorial Guinea which set in motion what we have called the vicious circle of 
tyranny  was the violent overreaction of Macías and his followers to the 1969 coup 
attempt. Had Macías been a confident and responsible ruler, he would have arrested 
and punished the plotters—as many other African rulers have done—without resorting 
to widespread killing and terror.” Instead, Fegley (1991:xlviii) describes how, 
“executions abounded. Often the entire population of an area would be herded 
together to hear a trial. ‘Defence’ lawyers would plead for mercy rather than offer a 
defence and the inevitable death sentence would be carried out in the form of a public 
spectacle.” A particularly brutal chronicle of events is provided by Roberts (2006:21):
 At one Christmas mass execution in a sports stadium in the capital, Malabo, 
 palace guards  shot 150 victims while music blared. The song: ‘Those Were the 
 Days, My Friend’. Other executions took place in the notorious Black Beach 
 prison, usually  at night. When it became expensive to use bullets, victims were 
 garroted or forced to kneel to have their skulls smashed with iron bars. Some 
 died of thirst; others were buried alive or died from gangrene following 
 torture. To spread terror, some were beheaded, their heads left on poles in the 
 streets. Emigrés were kidnapped and dragged home to be killed. Many  who 
 survived prison were driven insane.
There was no shortage of victims of Macías Nguema’s terror campaign. Fegley 
(1991:xlvii) notes that under the president’s changes to the constitution, Law No. 1 
was introduced. This “provided death as the penalty for ‘rebellion’ and ‘offences 
against territorial integrity’ and for any person who threatens, kills or attempts to kill 
the President or who deprives him of his personal freedom or uses violence or serious 
intimidation to force him to perform an act  against his will.” Cronje (1976:15) makes 
an important point when she writes that “violence and repression have a long history 
in Equatorial Guinea, owing much to the nature of Spanish colonial rule. But since 
independence in 1968, and especially since President Macias’ assumption of 
increasing personal power since 1970, legalised oppression and political murder have 
become commonplace instruments of government policy.” Indeed, it should be noted 
that Spain was a particularly  repressive colonial administration. However, Cronje 
(1976:13) also emphasises that “although Spanish rule undoubtedly set a particularly 
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brutal example of undemocratic government, Spain itself is not directly responsible 
for the reign of terror [...] by which President Macias runs the country.” This is true; 
however, it is also vital to acknowledge that a number of the policy decisions taken by 
Macías Nguema whilst he was in power were as a direct result of the way  that 
colonial policy was enacted by the Spanish. 
The key terror organisation in Equatorial Guinea under Macías Nguema was the 
Juventud en Marcha con Macías (JMM)—translated as ‘Youth on the March with 
Macías—a paramilitary organisation comprised of people aged 7-30 (Fegley, 
1989:67). According to Fegley  (1989:67-68), the JMM was “created on February  22, 
1969 [... it] became an internal security  force under a kinsman of Macías named 
Rafael Obiang N’Zogo after it  was institutionalized on February  12, 1970. The 
organization was given power to harass anyone outside of the highest levels of 
government and Macías’ own clan, the Esangui of Mongomo.” And “assassinations 
quickly became a way of life, as the JMM  freely roamed the country.” Fegley 
(1989:70) goes on to explain that, “by 1970 the country  had three security forces (the 
Guardia Naciónal, the JMM and the Milicia). Pitted against each other as well as 
against ‘enemies’ of the state, these organizations maintained a constant vigil over the 
country.” Moreover, Decalo (1998:92) explains that “the officer corps, like the upper 
echelons of the civil service, were linked to Nguema by ties of blood and kinship, and 
personally beholden to him for their well-being and even physical survival.” Indeed, 
Medard (1982:173) notes that by  the end of his presidency, Macías’ “entourage was 
practically  reduced to his own family  from the village of Mongomo.” The 
personalised nature of the security services is also emphasised by Fegley (1989:153); 
“Macías headed the ministries of defense, national security  and trade himself. The 
security forces and JMM mixed and mingled until any separate functions they may 
have had became hopelessly  muddled. They operated, sometimes barely controlled, as 
bands of extortionists.” The efficiency of the security  forces could not be questioned, 
as Sundiata (1990:2) reports that “in the eleven years of his [Macias’] rule, 1968 
through 1979, at least a third of the population was killed.” According to Artucio 
(1979:6) the JMM was the most dangerous force operating: “the worst forms of 
political repression are attributable to the Youth on the March with Macías. It  was 
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responsible for most of the atrocities, including killings, executions, torture, burning 
of villages and lootings. They  informed on anyone, resorted to violence as a line of 
conduct and generally aimed at terrorising the population.” Sundiata (1988:26) also 
stresses that rewards also motivated the system as well as repression. He writes that, 
“in the system established after 1969, the agents of terror (e.g., Juventud en Marcha 
con Macias) were able to both repress insular dissent and plunder the insular 
economy.” It is, however, key to note that, “of course, as the economy collapsed, the 
need for repression increased and the agents of terror began to see diminishing returns 
[...] the regime was not able to expand the area plundered. Terror was also difficult to 
delimit. It was on this rock, and not on the application of terror, per se, that the regime 
ultimately  foundered” (Sundiata 1988:26). As has already been mentioned, it was the 
very terror network that Macías Nguema established to protect himself that was to be 
responsible for his ultimate downfall and death. Fegley (1989:71) makes a valid point: 
“of course, anyone who creates such a system must also spend a great deal of time 
looking over their own shoulder. Such was certainly the case with Macías.” Sundiata 
(1988:27) explains that:
  When the regime collapsed, it  did not do so because of external pressures. 
 Macias Nguema was overthrown in a palace coup organized by his own 
 subalterns [...] by the Spring of 1979 terror in Equatorial Guinea had come to 
 include members of the president’s circle itself. He had members of his 
 bodyguard, who were reportedly members of his own clan, executed. In  June 
 of 1979 Macias struck at his inner circle by liquidating five military officers, 
 one of  whom was the brother of his successor, Lieutenant Colonel Obiang 
 Nguema Mbasango. It may have been evident to Obiang Mbasango, as well as 
 to other members of the president’s  entourage, that the apparatus of terror was 
 being devoured by its own agents. If the apparatus has been ‘functional’ in 
 1969, it was definitely  dysfunctional ten years later. Those  benefitting from the 
 terror had diminished to almost a minority of one.
And so it was that Lieutenant Colonel Obiang Nguema Mbasango led a military  coup 
d’état that ousted President Macías Nguema from power. He was captured after 
fleeing his bunker in Mongomo in August  1979 with two suitcases stuffed full of 
foreign currency (the entirety  of the country’s foreign reserves) (Meredith, 2006:243). 
Baynham (1986:30) reports the following pitiful statistics:
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 President  Nguema’s  11  years  of  rule  had  resulted  in  between  35 000  and 
 50 000 deaths, with at  least one-quarter of the country’s 350 000 estimated 
 population in exile. Exiles in  Madrid claim that Nguema was responsible for 
 as many as 80 000 deaths. According to political refugees in Madrid, Yaounde 
 and Libreville, Equatorial Guinea’s professional and administrative class had 
 been almost entirely eradicated. Only two doctors remained in the 
 country, one of whom, a psychiatrist, was employed to treat Nguema for an 
 assortment of  mental disorders.
The extent of Macías Nguema’s terror network and its ‘success’ is evident in the fact 
that he managed to kill at least 21 of his cabinet ministers (Shaxson 2008:33). Perhaps 
the greatest indication of the terrible extent of Macías Nguema’s terror network and 
how much he himself was feared is seen in that “his execution had to be carried out 
by élite Moroccan troops after Equatorial Guinean soldiers refused to involve 
themselves. He swore his ghost would return to haunt those who had condemned him 
to death” (Fegley 1991:li). It is therefore unsurprising that Decalo (1998:13) argues 
that Macías Nguema’s Equatorial Guinea, Amin’s Uganda and Bokassa’s Central 
African Republic, “stand out starkly, by virtue of their sheer brutality and the highly 
arbitrary nature of their dictatorial rule.” It is through such an excessive and all-
encompassing terror network that it  is possible to see that Macías Nguema’s 
presidency stands out as a clear example of Bavister-Gould’s (2011) definition of a 
‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regime. 
3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has provided an overview of the history  of Equatorial Guinea from 
Spanish colonialism through decolonisation and the first eleven years of independence 
under the presidency of Macías Nguema. It has shown that under Spanish colonialism 
conditions were ripe for the future development of a system of neo-patrimonialism as 
the colonial administration practiced a policy of divide-and-rule favouring the Bubi, 
and to a lesser extent, the Fernandino on the island of Fernando Po, whilst  neglecting 
the Fang of the mainland territory  of Río Muni. The analysis of the presidency of 
Macías Nguema highlights the detrimental effect that such a policy had on the newly-
independent Equatorial Guinea. The inferiority  complex and anti-Spanish sentiment 
that was instilled in Macías Nguema by the policy of emancipation had a direct 
55
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
bearing on the treatment and terror that  he enacted once he became president in 1968. 
Furthermore, the relatively rapid rate at which the process of decolonisation was 
carried out, meant that—coupled with the unequal levels of colonisation and 
development that the Spanish had performed in the different territories of Equatorial 
Guinea—the two principal regions of Fernando Po and Río Muni were not adequately 
unified, which only  served to cause heightened troubles once Macías Nguema came to 
power. Furthermore, the institutions that did exist were not fully developed and 
therefore easily fell victim to nepotism and corruption following independence. 
Additionally, having been colonised by Franco’s Spain—characterised by a fascist, 
authoritarian system of government—it is unsurprising that  democracy did not take 
hold in Equatorial Guinea. After all, as Sundiata (1990:55) emphasises, “the hastily 
conceived constitution was alien to the colonial power that retired from Equatorial 
Guinea in 1968. It  was equally alien to the political realities that governed the lives of 
the majority of the new nation’s citizens.” A similar point is made by Ghazvinian 
(2007:171) who notes that the democratic elections held for Equatorial Guinea’s 
independence were the only democratic elections that Franco ever organised.
Although Spanish colonialism had laid the foundations for a system of neo-
patrimonialism being established in Equatorial Guinea following independence, it was 
Macías Nguema as the first post-independence president that truly developed such a 
regime. Soon after becoming president he purged the country of Spanish presence and 
influence and sought to eliminate the rival Bubi and Fernandino ethnic groups, 
favouring his own Fang tribe. He practiced nepotism by filling the majority of 
government positions with members of the Fang; regardless of whether they were 
adequately qualified for the role. Indeed, Jackson and Rosberg (1982:242) argue that 
it was a Fang government, rather than one representative of Equatorial Guinea as a 
whole. Over the course of his presidency, Macías Nguema increasingly personalised 
his rule, surrounding himself with a small circle of loyal kinsmen drawn either from 
his family or Esangui clan. As such he conducted a regime which fits with Bavister-
Gould’s (2011) definition of ‘predatory’ rule. The fact that by the end of his rule, at 
least 35 000 people had been killed and a further quarter of the population were in 
exile bears testament to the efficient and ruthless terror network that he created, 
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particularly in the form of the JMM. Anyone who fell outside of his clan was targeted. 
It was, however, the terror network that was to prove Macías Nguema’s final 
downfall. It  was so ruthless that even its creator was not immune from its violent 
clutches. Having begun to target his own loyal supporters, Macías Nguema was 
deposed in a coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Obiang Nguema Mbasango in August 
1979. Initially promising a rupture from the old order, Obiang Nguema has now been 
in charge of Equatorial Guinea for over 30 years. His increasingly ruthless methods to 
prop up his excessive neo-patrimonial regime are to be examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV
THE ENTRENCHMENT OF NEO-PATRIMONIALISM IN 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA: THE PRESIDENCY OF OBIANG 
NGUEMA AND THE DISCOVERY OF OIL
“Although the head of the snake has been cut off, Equatorial Guinea is still left with 
the same snake.”
Africa Confidential.
“It is hard to think of many African despots who make Robert Mugabe seem stable 
and benign, but Teodoro Obiang Nguema is one who does.”
Steve Bloomfield, The Independent on Sunday.
4.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Chapter three provided a firm basis of the development of neo-patrimonialism in 
Equatorial Guinea under the first post-independence president, Macías Nguema. 
Whilst it is clear that the regime of Macías served to decimate Equatorial Guinea 
beyond recognition from the promising future that  lay  ahead of the country at the time 
of independence from Spain in 1968 (Wornoff 1988:vii), this chapter will show how 
any great hopes for a significant change in fortunes after Macías was overthrown in 
the 1979 coup  by his nephew, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, were soon dashed. Indeed, 
Fegley  (1989:231) argues that, “if Equatorial Guinea had turned over a new leaf [with 
the replacement of Macías with Obiang], it  is still on the same branch as the old. 
Obiang retains the final word.” A similar image is evoked by Decalo (1998:99) who 
notes that  “the clothes of the emperor may  be different, but the modality  of rule—
personal dictatorship—is very much intact in Malabo.” This chapter will trace the 
entrenchment of neo-patrimonialism under Obiang Nguema (who with the deposing 
of Muammar Gaddafi of Libya became the longest serving president of an African 
nation—at the time of writing; 34 years) (Human Rights Watch 2012:1). Initially the 
first fifteen years or so of Obiang’s presidency  will be examined to show how despite 
inheriting a state and economy in tatters, Obiang and his inner circle of elites still 
managed to enact an extensive policy of neo-patrimonialism. The effects of the 
discovery  of oil in 1996 will dominate the remainder of the chapter. The vast oil 
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wealth that has accrued to Equatorial Guinea since, giving it the highest GDP per 
capita in Africa and one outstripping many nations of the developed world—including 
New Zealand, Italy  and South Korea (Open Society Justice Initiative 2010:4)—has 
not benefitted the majority who continue to “sail in a sea of misery” (Abaga quoted in 
Shaxson 2008:122). As will become apparent, the astronomical gap between GDP per 
capita growth and HDI ranking—93 places, making it the country  with the biggest 
negative difference (Shaxson 2008:142)—is widely attributable to the extensive neo-
patrimonial system in operation. The impact  of this system on Equatorial Guinea will 
be illustrated in the remainder of this chapter through a description and explanation of 
the following factors: the resource curse, the Riggs banking scandal, the profligate 
spending of the President’s son (and widely-touted heir apparent) Teodorín Nguema, 
international relations (most notably with the US and China). Finally, in part as an 
attempt to predict what future lies ahead for Equatorial Guinea, various drives to 
control corruption and introduce transparency initiatives will be examined to see how 
neo-patrimonialism will continue to liquidate the state if extensive action to curb it is 
not taken. Overall, this chapter will provide a clear picture of how neo-patrimonialism 
has become entrenched in Equatorial Guinea to the extent that it is the most fitting 
explanation for the state’s current condition and is an archetypal example of Chabal 
and Daloz’s (1999) theory of the ‘political instrumentalization of disorder.’
4.2 THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES(?): THE EARLY YEARS  UNDER 
OBIANG NGUEMA 1979-1996
Teodoro Obiang Nguema has been president of Equatorial Guinea since he overthrew 
Macías Nguema (his uncle) in the 1979 coup d’état (Williams 2011:623). As was 
detailed in the previous chapter on Macías’ rule, by the time he was deposed, “one-
third of the population had been killed or exiled” (Woods 2004:548). It is, therefore, 
perhaps unsurprising that Obiang has described himself as “Liberator of the 
People” (Shaxson 2008:35). Such praise for his regime, however, is not forthcoming 
from Equatorial Guineans outside of his inner circle of kinsmen and cronies. Indeed, 
Yates (2012:94) describes how:
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 Since 1979, Obiang Nguema and his military junta have run one of the most  
 despotic tyrannies on the African continent. Although it seems hard to believe 
 that anything could have been worse than his uncle Macias’ reign of terror, 
 keep  in mind that Obiang had been the head of state security  under the old 
 regime, and continued its bloody policies once he took power himself.
Whilst Shaxson (2008:123) argues that “Obiang was not as brutal as his bloodthirsty 
uncle Macias,” Woods (2004:547) highlights the fact that  he is “regularly  named as 
one of the worst despots in the world.” Indeed, Bloomfield (2007) goes so far as to 
say that, “it is hard to think of many African despots who make Robert Mugabe seem 
stable and benign, but Teodoro Obiang Nguema is one who does.” As a result it is 
already clear to see that Obaing’s presidency represented a mere continuation of the 
previous regime, rather than the rupture that was hoped for shortly after he took 
power. Decalo (1998:103) goes so far as to contend that, “a definitive postmortem of 
dictatorship  in Equatorial Guinea is not yet possible. Tyranny still reigns supreme in 
the Malabo of 1998 as it  did twenty  years ago.” Indeed, the presidency of Obiang has 
come to be dominated by the same loathsome features as Macías’: (i) constitutional 
adaptation; (ii) Nguemism created through ethnic and clan loyalties and the ensuing 
self-enrichment and; (iii) human rights abuse and crushing of all elements of 
opposition. All of these factors combined to entrench an archetypal neo-patrimonial 
regime. These three elements will now be explained in more detail to show how in the 
early years of his presidency, Obiang Nguema managed to sustain the neo-patrimonial 
practices introduced under Macías’ presidency from 1968-1979.
4.2.1 Constitutional adaptation
Two years after taking power, Obiang acknowledged the need for a new constitution 
and in 1982 this was drafted with the help of representatives from the UN 
Commission on Human Rights. Sundiata (1990:76) describes how “the powers of his 
presidency were considerable. He can make laws by decree, dissolve the legislature, 
negotiate and ratify treaties, call for parliamentary elections, and dismiss members of 
the cabinet [...] The prime minister is appointed, dismissed, and granted power by the 
head of state.” Fegley (1989:210) argues that “a kind of schizophrenia pervades the 
document. Fundamental freedoms and all manner of “economic” rights stand side by 
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side with a strong presidency and an underlying tone of Flangist2 (sic) , if not Macías, 
authoritarianism.” Similarly Decalo (1998:101) describes how, “although Obiang 
slowly “civilianized” his cabinet [...] there was little sharing of power in Malabo. In 
1982, a referendum gave the country  a constitution that, on paper at least, is one of the 
most liberal in Africa [...] But these measures reduced neither Obiang’s concentrated 
power [...] nor the top-heavy preponderance of Fang elements in the administration 
and government.” The reason for ensuring such a tight grip on power, according to 
Fegley  (1989:211), was Obiang’s “fear that he would one day face prosecution for his 
crimes in the Macías era.” Indeed, he goes on to note that “this may well be one 
reason why he [Obiang] laid down one condition before his acceptance of the draft: 
His term of office as president would begin on the day the constitution was approved 
by referendum. This meant that he would be legally guaranteed another seven years in 
office, seven years in which he could lose the stigma of being the butcher of 
Blackbich3” (Fegley 1989:211). Such measures are by  no means unique to Obiang’s 
rule in Equatorial Guinea, and have been seen regularly in post-independence Africa 
in particular, as dictators have done their utmost to remain in power. Moreover, such 
actions are a central element of neo-patrimonial regimes. As Bratton and van de Walle 
(1997:62) explain, “the right to rule in neopatrimonial regimes is ascribed to a person 
rather than to an office, despite the official existence of a written constitution. One 
individual [...] often a president for life, dominates the state apparatus and stands 
above its laws.” Furthermore, the concentration of a high degree of political power 
within a narrow “predatory  coalition” is a central characteristic of a neo-patrimonial 
regime according to Bavister-Gould (2011:1). Fegley (1989:225) surmises that:
 By the end of his eighth year in power [1987], a clearer picture of Teodoro 
 Obiang Nguema had emerged. As an extremely shrewd man with a checkered 
 past and a present tainted with corruption, he has maneuvered himself into a 
 position whereby he is the focal point of all  power in Equatorial Guinea. He is 
 the only  remaining top official in the country  whose roots are in the two 
 concentrations of power which have arisen in post-colonial Equatorial 
 Guinea: the military and the Esangui.
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Similarly, Human Rights Watch (2009:8) notes thats that “Obiang—not to be outdone 
by his predecessor and uncle—continued in the tradition of consolidating absolute and 
self-aggrandizing power.” And as such, the International Bar Association (2003:11) 
describes how, “there has been little more than ‘lip-service’ paid to multi-party 
democracy.” Taylor (2010:139) goes as far as to liken elections in Equatorial Guinea 
to those in North Korea with a presidential return of 99 percent. Consequently, 
Williams (2011:639) notes, “the Obiang regime, which came to power in a coup d’état 
and has stayed in power for over thirty  years through corruption, violence, and the 
repression of opposition groups, can make no claim to legitimacy.” A key  way in 
which Obiang has managed to continue his reign for so long is through surrounding 
himself with elites and cronies from his Esangui clan through his unique brand of 
‘Nguemism’; an examination of this phenomenon now follows.
4.2.2 The enactment of ‘Nguemism’ and self-enrichment
A key  attribute of the Macías regime was the centrality of the Esangui clan to politics. 
At the centre was Macías supported by his kinsmen and loyal henchmen. Power (and 
loyalty) gradually  decreased as the concentric rings got larger. A similar strategy has 
been employed by Obiang since he became president in 1979. Shaxson (2008:124) 
notes that “at  the center sits the president; next is his close family, then his sub-clan, 
then his Esangui clan from Mongomo [...] Kin relationships are central.” Fegley 
(1989:101) describes how “the original junta that came to power in 1979 was 
overwhelmingly  composed of Nguema’s relatives, most from the Esangui clan and 
Mongomo region.” This is a classic feature of a neo-patrimonial regime—at the centre 
sits the ‘big man’ surrounded by his clients (in this case family and loyal kinsmen). As 
a result, Sandbrook and Barker (1985:89), explain: “A chief or strongman emerges 
and rules on the basis of material incentives and personal control of his administration 
and armed force. Fear and personal loyalties are the mainstays of a personalistic 
government untrammelled by traditional or modern constitutional limitations.” The 
danger of such a system based primarily  on ties of kinship rather than democracy or 
meritocracy is that, according to Bratton and van de Walle (1997:62), “the chief 
executive and his inner circle undermine the effectiveness of the nominally modern 
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state administration by  using it for systematic patronage and clientelist  practices in 
order to maintain political order.” In addition to using the system to cling to political 
power, it will also become apparent in later sections that Obiang and his Esangui clan 
and the wider Fang ethnic group  have used power primarily for self-enrichment 
purposes. The extremeness of the situation is made clear in the following quotation by 
Shaxson (2008:124): 
 An opposition activist, Juan Nzo, put it simply: “La Família. There is nobody  
 else.” Others,  in private, call them Los Gordos or Los Intocables—The Fat 
 Ones; The Untouchables. “The institutions of the state have a phantasmal 
 existence, said an exiled oppositions party. “Everything is manipulated to the 
 will of the dictator.”
Woods (2004:547) goes even further by  describing how “Equatorial Guinea’s ‘family 
caudillismo’ Nguemist regime matches or exceeds earlier Latin American 
manifestations both in rapacity  and brutality.” He continues by  noting that “Obiang 
initially pledged to put an end to the excesses of the Macias years.” However, in the 
end, “Obiang remained committed to entrenching his personal authority  and that  of 
the clan” (Woods 2004:549). As a result, Sundiata (1990:77) notes that the Cámar de 
Representantes del Pueblo (the Chamber of the People’s Representatives/the 
legislature) is controlled entirely by the president and cannot take any action without 
him sanctioning it. There were, however, some breaks with the past attempted, 
according to Sundiata (1990:78-79):
 The government did eliminate the most glaring abuses of the Macias Nguema 
 period. The appointment of a Bubi vice-president, S. Seriche Bioco, signaled a 
 desire to give the regime the appearance of a broader ethnic base. However, 
 Seriche Bioco remained the only non-Fang in high office. Armengol Ondo 
 Nguema, the president’s elder brother, has been director of national security. 
 The other two key security  posts are in the hands of men with ethnic and 
 personal ties to Obiang Nguema. Jesus Ngomo Nvono is head of the police 
 and Ebengeng Nsomo is the deputy minister of defense. In a cabinet  
 realignment in early 1986, Obiang Nguema assumed duties as minister of 
 defense.
It is therefore apparent that  by creating such a loyal clique it has been possible for 
President Obiang Nguema to ensure loyalty to his regime. Furthermore, by having 
such a tight grip on the security services it has made it possible for him to order 
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purges of the opposition as and when he has seen fit. Consequently, Shaxson 
(2008:124) explains that, “the Mongomo Clan has kept a tight grip  since 
independence, when Obiang’s uncle Macias took over. Since toppling him in 1979, 
Obiang has directed bloody purges every  18 months or so, alleging coup plots that are 
often (but not always) fabricated.” Decalo (1998:101) describes how increasing coup 
attempts and conspiracies were a direct result  of the concentration of power in 
Obiang’s hands. As with all neo-patrimonial regimes, the ‘have nots’ are forced to 
rebel in an attempt to gain a piece of the national pie.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, one way in which Obiang’s predecessor, 
Macías sought to ensure his continuing power was through the creation of a cult of 
personality. Increasingly  extreme (and comical) and rivalling only  Idi Amin’s ‘Last 
King of Scotland’ in absurdity, Macías was to be known as “sole miracle” of 
Equatorial Guinea (Sundiata, 1983:93) amongst others. In a similar vein, Shaxson 
(2008:125) describes how:
 Obiang is everywhere: on television or on the radio; he looks down from 
 beneath his craggy  eyebrows, frames in large portraits that hang in all the 
 offices, which are talismans against  bad luck [...] State media praises him, 
 sometimes a bit too effusively. President Obiang “is like God in heaven. He 
 has all power over men and things,” the radio once said. “He can decide to kill 
 without being called to account and without going to hell because God 
 himself, with whom he is in constant contact, gives him this strength.”
This last statement, is more tragic than comic when it  is remembered how brutal and 
murderous Obiang’s regime has been. Bloomfield (2007:63) succinctly  labels him “a 
brutal, bizarre jailer” whilst Fegley (1989:211) chooses the damning, alliterative label 
of “the butcher of Blackbich.” Although the numbers killed by Obiang’s regime may 
be only a fraction of those obliterated by his predecessor, the brutality has been no 
less, as will become apparent in the subsequent description of human rights abuses 
and the systematic liquidation of opposition figures. It  is therefore unsurprising that 
Obiang is commonly known as ‘El Jefe’—The Boss (Global Witness 2004:53). 
El Jefe has, since he took power in 1979, headed up  a rather lucrative self-enrichment 
network. Ghazvinian (2007:177) argues that “it is probably  fair to say that Equatorial 
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Guinea is less a functioning country than it  is a lucrative family  business that happens 
to come with a flag, an anthem, an army, and a seat at the United Nations.” The 
corruption and graft since the discovery  of oil has been well-documented, but the 
commitment to self-enrichment has much earlier roots and highlights the entrenched 
nature of neo-patrimonialism in Equatorial Guinea. It is at this point worth 
remembering Bach’s theory of ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonialism. Such a system sees 
“personal rule and control of resources reach paroxysmic level” (Bach 2012:30). As 
mentioned in chapter two, this study  argues that Equatorial Guinea is an archetypal 
example of such a regime. According to the Open Society  Justice Initiative (2010) the 
corrupt nature of the regime was thriving long before oil extraction began. A World 
Bank cocoa project introduced in the early 1980s to revive the industry decimated 
under Macías was exploited by Obiang and his cronies. Sundiata (1990:78) describes 
how, “in the early 1980s the bank announced that agricultural loans would be granted 
to landowners. The president and members of his family were quick to acquire land.” 
The Open Society  Justice Initiative (2010) pronounced that “top government officials 
had foreseen a gold mine.” As a result, “in 1984 there were draconian nationalizations 
of farms that  had not been continually occupied during the Macias terror. Most had 
been owned by  Spaniards and Portuguese; now government ministers held title to the 
choicest farms. The Prime Minister had a beauty near Luba, and the President himself 
seized nearly four thousand acres near the Malabo airport” (Open Society Justice 
Initiative 2010). As Sundiata (1990:87) makes clear, the redistribution of resources, 
wealth and benefits were vital in order for Obiang to ensure sustained support for his 
regime; to avoid a similar fate to his uncle befalling him. The seizure of cocoa farms 
and the ensuing self-enrichment was not the only  example of such corruption in the 
early years of Obiang’s presidency. Williams (2011:632) describes how endemic 
corruption had a tragic bearing on a measles epidemic that wreaked a trail of 
devastation through Equatorial Guinea in the 1980s. He describes how vaccines were 
made available through donations from outside the country. The drugs, however, 
“were reportedly stolen by government officials to be sold outside Equatorial 
Guinea.” Consequently, Fegley (1989:204) describes how, “much of the money 
received from international donors had been embezzled or squandered by officials. 
Swiss bank accounts had become part of the everyday life of the Equatorial Guinean 
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elite, while development plans and essential services ground to a halt.” This of course 
is routine behaviour in a neo-patrimonial regime. Mills (2010:16) explains that such 
behaviour is displayed and a resultant lack of development experienced because 
“better choices in the broad public interest were in many cases not in the leaders’ 
personal and often financial self-interest.” This is also a central element of Chabal and 
Daloz’s (1999:155) theory of disorder as political instrument—by keeping the state 
disordered it is easier for the elites to reach their own goal of self-enrichment. It  is 
therefore clear that Chabal’s (2009:70) observation that  a system of neo-
patrimonialism is “nefarious to good governance” is an accurate description of the 
situation in Equatorial Guinea under Obiang Nguema. Indeed, Soares de Oliveira 
(2007:224) provides this fitting conclusion:
 Even if one writes off Equatorial Guinea’s first decade of independence as a 
 political freak  occurrence, the post-1979 record remains uninspiring. In fact, a 
 seminal work4 considered pre-oil boom Equatorial Guinea to be one of the few 
 states in sub-Saharan Africa in possession of a fully criminalised economy [...] 
 Teodoro Obiang Nguema, halted the more demented forms of persecution [...] 
 but had little impact on the downward slide of the formal economy. The 
 decade that preceded the oil boom was characterised by an unusual degree of 
 delinquency, with the presidential clan exploring the most farfetched forms of 
 economic extraversion to ensure personal and regime viability. John Bennett, a 
 former US ambassador to Equatorial Guinea, described the regime as not so 
 much a government as “an ongoing  family criminal conspiracy.”
As will become apparent later in this chapter, such a network of appropriation and 
self-enrichment was only  going to thrive and become even more profitable after the 
discovery  of oil. It  is, however, obvious that the corruption and the looting of state 
coffers was already accepted and entrenched practice. Therefore, it  is fair to say  that, 
“oil has exacerbated already present pathologies in Equatorial Guinea’s political 
economy, paving the way for a future of underdevelopment, instability and 
authoritarian rule” (McSherry 2006:24). The authoritarian nature of the Obiang 
regime is seen most obviously through the gross human rights abuses and purging of 
opposition elements to which our attention will now turn.
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4.2.3 “The butcher of Blackbich”: human rights abuse and the elimination of 
opposition elements
Chapter three illustrated the extensive terror and torture network that was 
operationalised in Equatorial Guinea under Macías Nguema. Baynham (1986:30) 
notes that, “President  Nguema’s 11 years of rule had resulted in between 35 000 and 
50 000 deaths, with at least one-quarter of the country’s 350 000 estimated population 
in exile.” As a result, a Spanish newspaper reported that the only business worth 
setting up in Equatorial Guinea would be a funeral parlour (quoted in Global Witness 
2004:53). In contrast, Human Rights Watch (2009:8) reports how, “under Obiang, 
schools have reopened, primary education has expanded, and public utilities and roads 
have been restored; to that extent his rule compares favourably with Macías’ tyranny 
and terror.” The same report, however, goes on to note that, “there have been no free 
and fair elections since independence in 1968. The calling of elections has often been 
accompanied by intimidation and imprisonment of the opposition; the government has 
typically used the pretext of thwarting a coup attempt as justification for its 
actions” (Human Rights Watch 2009:11). Sundiata (1990:80), however, notes that 
“the government and its supporters have been highly adept at obscuring the issue [of 
human rights abuses]. The 1985 report of Amnesty International [...] did not include 
Equatorial Guinea. It did say that the absence of certain countries was not proof of an 
absence of human rights violations but only indicated the difficulty of getting 
information.” As a result, Woods (2004:547) explains that “the country has a well-
deserved reputation for gross human rights abuses.” A similar conclusion is drawn by 
McSherry (2006:25) who notes that “human rights groups routinely describe him as 
one of the world’s worst dictators, pointing to gross human rights abuses and tight 
restrictions on civil and political freedoms.” Such a situation fits with Chabal and 
Daloz’s neo-patrimonial theory where they note that  “in most African countries the 
‘state’ not only fails to protect the population from crime but is itself responsible for a 
high level of violence, both through the direct abuse of power and because of its 
predatory nature” (1999:77). Moreover, Bavister-Gould’s (2011) criteria for a 
‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regime includes (amongst others) the following: “a 
ruthless application of coercion and repression to gain and especially maintain power; 
[...] the use of a mixture of fear and reward as a means of retaining the loyalty  of 
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immediate followers and supporters; [...] the use of often considerable brutality  and 
exclusion as the means for punishing opponents or competitors” (Bavister-Gould:1-2). 
It is clear that the extreme level of terror and brutality that is employed by the 
Nguema regime to ensure its survival marks it out as a ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial 
state. 
Whilst many hoped that the use of terror and the resulting brutal human rights abuses 
would be destroyed with Macías, Woods (2004:549) instead notes that “despite claims 
of acting as a ‘liberator’, his [Obiang’s] coup represented less of a revolution than the 
reconstitution of Nguemism.” Furthermore, Yates (2012:94) argues that the 
continuation of barbarous acts under Obiang should not be a surprise, considering that 
he was head of state security under Macías. A key feature of Obiang’s terror machine 
was his employment of the Moroccan Guard (as Chapter three detailed, the execution 
of Macías had to be entrusted to them as no Equatorial Guinean soldier agreed to 
carry  out the killing for fear of supernatural retribution). Indeed, Sundiata (1990:77) 
describes how “the use of several hundred Moroccan troops as a presidential 
bodyguard has provided the leadership with a further hedge against  a coup d’état or 
popular revolution. Although local forces outnumber these troops, they  are ill-
equipped.” Such a situation is common in states dominated by neo-patrimonial rule. 
This is because concerns about internal power struggles and mutiny are significantly 
reduced by not employing citizens of the country: loyalty  is only to the employer 
rather than any clan or familial ties. Obiang now relies on the services of a US private 
security company; a reflection of the close ties between the two countries as a result 
of the discovery of oil and the US as the main consumer of this. This is in vast 
contrast to the conditions of relations between the two states in the early 1990s. 
Soares de Oliveira (2007:229) describes how, “the US government had until recently 
a sufficiently detached rapport with Equatorial Guinea to allow a dispassionate look at 
its politics. Especially  in the early  1990s, this led to a very critical stance on human 
rights abuses that precipitated government accusations of witchcraft against the US 
Ambassador. This was one affront too many from an obscure backwater and led to the 
closing down of the embassy in 1995.” It is, therefore, perhaps surprising that less 
than ten years later in 2003 the embassy was reopened, even though no change in 
68
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
government and consequently  human rights abuses had occurred (Taylor 2010:138). 
The Washington Post (2006) was incredulous when it reported that, “it is 
uncontroversial to observe that Mr. Obiang is no friend to his people. But he is a 
"good friend" of the United States, at least according to Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice.” Then again, given that only a short time after the US withdrew 
from Equatorial Guinea significant oil reserves were discovered offshore (Taylor 
2010:138) it all becomes much more transparent. 
In sum, the disastrous condition that Equatorial Guinea was in when Macías was 
overthrown in 1979 was barely  improved after the first decade of Obiang’s rule (prior 
to the discovery of oil). Indeed, Fegley (1989:231) offers this scathing conclusion: 
 If Equatorial Guinea had turned a new leaf, it is still on the same branch as the 
 old. Obiang retains the final word. New, constitutions, legislative elections and 
 religious freedom should not be discarded as ploys too quickly, but the 
 President’s less-than-democratic attitudes cannot be ignored. If Obiang’s 
 regime is not as violent as its predecessor’s, it may be a sign that times are 
 getting better. On the other hand, the lesser tyranny of the nephew may only 
 indicate how effectively the cruelty of the uncle dealt with their common foes. 
 One cannot say that the political position of the exiles has improved in any 
 way; the reverse is probably   the case [...] Economically, no landmarks have 
 been passed and socially  the country is still  catching up to 1968. There are 
 many indicators which lead one to optimism or pessimism, but to most  
 observers Equatorial Guinea seems to be on a treadmill going nowhere. The 
 spells caused by both Madrid and Macías remain to be broken.
The subsequent section focused on developments in Equatorial Guinea following the 
discovery  of oil will attempt to show whether these spells have indeed been broken, or 
whether the vast sums associated with oil extraction have in fact served to entrench 
the neo-patrimonial Obiang regime further.
4.3 FROM THE ARMPIT TO THE KUWAIT OF AFRICA(?): EQUATORIAL 
GUINEA SINCE THE DISCOVERY OF OIL (1996-PRESENT)
Prior to the discovery of oil in 1995 Equatorial Guinea was widely  regarded as a 
‘tropical backwater’; or at least by the few who had heard of this small country  in the 
armpit of West Africa (Clarke 2010:136; Frynas 2004:527; Gary  and Karl 2003:38; 
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Ghazvinian 2007:170; McSherry 2006:24). Indeed, Frynas (2004:527) describes how, 
“in less than a decade, Equatorial Guinea has transformed itself from an African 
backwater into one of the world’s fastest growing economies and a sought-after 
political partner in the Gulf of Guinea. The sole reason for this transformation has 
been the discovery of oil and gas.” The discovery of oil and the resultant meteoric rise 
in income means that Equatorial Guinea boasts the highest GDP per capita in Africa 
$24,036 (2012) (World Bank 2013a) and means that the country is classed as a high 
income country by the World Bank (2013b). As the introduction to this thesis noted, 
however, according to the UNDP HDI Equatorial Guinea is ranked 136 out of 187 
countries (UNDP 2013). As will become apparent through the following discussion, it 
is the ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regime in place in Equatorial Guinea that is 
responsible for the vast disparity between GDP per capita income and Human 
Development Index ranking. Knight (2003:338) questions whether “this new wealth 
[from oil] will benefit the majority  of people [... because...] The government’s long-
term economic record is poor.” Sobering words are provided by  Ndikumana and 
Boyce (2012:2) who note that: 
 
 Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of Congo are among the richest  
 countries in Africa [...] While their presidents and other members of the 
 political elite are amassing fortunes abroad, the majority of their fellow 
 citizens live in abject poverty, lacking access to basic social services such as 
 decent sanitation, clean drinking water, elementary school, and health care. 
 Despite Equatorial Guinea’s large oil revenues, a baby born there has less 
 chance of living to his or her fifth birthday than the average sub-Saharan 
 African infant.
The central explanation for such a sorry state of affairs, according to Frère (2007:207) 
is that, “Equatorial Guinea, an authoritarian and neopatrimonial state, is organized for 
the benefit of a single family who monopolizes the state’s resources and functions.” 
Indeed, Ghazvinian (2007:177) describes how, “Equatorial Guinea is [...] a lucrative 
family business” and “a self-parodying burlesque of a tin-pot kleptocracy” (Ghaz-
vinian 2007:170).  Similarly, Puppim de Oliveira and Ali (2006:7) argue that “the EG 
government is considered by  many commentators as one of the most notorious 
kleptocracies in Africa.” It is the ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regime in place that 
explains why the son of President Obiang, Teodorín (widely touted as his likely 
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successor) can stay at  the luxurious Plaza Athénée in Paris, own a Malibu mansion 
and spend $7 million on houses in Cape Town whilst  always carrying a briefcase 
stuffed with cash (Global Witness 2009a); yet, outside of one of the many swish oil 
conferences hosted in the capital, Malabo, “restrained by a low wall and the soldiers, 
people in tattered shirts and flip-flops stood in dirty brown groups, watching and 
listening. The chances are that they cannot afford doctors, one in six of their children 
die before their fifth birthday, and their drinking water tastes of mud” (Shaxson 
2008:122). The remainder of this chapter will provide a discussion and explanation of 
the effect of the discovery of oil in Equatorial Guinea and how it has only served to 
exacerbate neo-patrimonial practices and entrench the Obiang regime. First, a 
discussion of the resource curse in relation to Equatorial Guinea will be given, 
followed by  an insight into three central factors that highlight neo-patrimonialism in 
Equatorial Guinea since the discovery of oil. These are: (i) capital flight, profligate 
spending and international complacency; (ii) repression of opponents and human 
rights abuses (including a brief summary of the 2004 ‘Wonga’ Coup) and; (iii) 
transparency initiatives and prospects for oil and regime survival in the future. By 
carrying out this analysis it will possible to ascertain the extent to which neo-
patrimonialism has become entrenched in Equatorial Guinea and whether the 
classification of the Nguema regime as ‘predatory’ is justified.
4.3.1 Well oiled: the ‘resource curse’ in Equatorial Guinea
Following the publication of the 2013 World Development Indicators by the World 
Bank, Marcelo Guigale, the Bank’s Director of Economic Policy and Poverty 
Reduction Programs for Africa, commented that most of the countries “with the 
highest incidence of extreme poverty [...]  are rich or very rich in natural resources, 
things like oil, gas or minerals” (Guigale 2013). As such, the founder of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Juan Pablo Alfonzo, warned 
that instead of being “black gold” petroleum revenues can instead turn out to be “the 
excrement of the devil” (quoted in Gary and Karl 2003:19). This ‘paradox of plenty’ 
is explained by Bridge and Le Billion (2013:32) who describe how, “oil often fuels 
dreams of development, yet the reality  of modernization through oil frequently falls 
short. Tensions revolve around the management, or squandering of oil reserves, the 
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creation of oil dependency, and the challenges of the so-called “resource curse”—that 
countries with abundant natural resources tend to have worse development outcomes 
than those with limited endowments.” Similarly, Dunning (2008:xv) notes that, “a 
massive flow of natural resource revenues into the fiscal coffers of the state 
engendered perverse political as well as economic effects. Not only did natural 
resource booms cripple non-resource export sectors and inhibit various forms of 
productive economic activity, they also fostered corruption, weakened accountability, 
and heightened incentives for rent-seeking.” Moreover, McSherry (2006:24) describes 
how in Equatorial Guinea:
 [A] combination of poor development performance, entrenched 
 authoritarianism, and  political instability  mirror the experiences of other 
 natural resource abundant countries  throughout the world. The so-called 
 “resource curse” has thwarted the hopes of many poor, primary commodity 
 exporters and spawned an extensive academic literature intent on explaining 
 this seemingly  paradoxical outcome.5  This diverse literature can help  explain 
 Equatorial Guinea’s current plight and shed light on what lies ahead -- further 
 underdevelopment, few opportunities for democratization, increased political 
 instability, and violence. 
It would seem to be clear that Equatorial Guinea is an archetypal example of a state 
suffering from a ‘resource curse’. Gary and Karl (2003:39) observe that “in less than a 
decade, and in the classic boom scenario, oil has gone from being completely 
unknown to being the only game in town — the oil sector rose from 11 percent  of 
GDP in 1993 to 86 percent in 2000.” Whereas “agriculture — primarily cocoa and 
coffee — has fallen as a percentage of GDP from almost 60 percent in 1991 to less 
than 9 percent in 2000.” Taylor (2010:139) meanwhile reports that “in Equatorial 
Guinea oil represents 92 percent of its total exports.” Despite this huge increase in 
income, improvements in terms of development are hard to see:
 Billions of dollars of oil revenue have gone into building an ostentatious 
 second capital city (“Malabo II”), while health and education remains a mere 
 1.23 percent of the government’s budget, despite the desperate need for basic 
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5 The ‘resource curse’ thesis first proposed by Auty in 1993 “focuses on the tendency of natural 
resource abundant countries to suffer from low economic growth and disappointing development 
outcomes” (McSherry, 2006: 26). This has given rise to an extensive body of academic literature and 
debate. This debate, however, will not be entered into here as it is not the primary theoretical focus of 
this thesis.
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 infrastructure constructions such as roads, schools and hospital. Meanwhile at 
 least 80 percent of oil revenues are captured by 5 percent of the country’s 
 population [emphasis added], who indulge in profligate spending on 
 luxury items.
A central explanation for the negative effects that the oil discovery has had on 
Equatorial Guinea is that the state was already in a condition of political dereliction. 
Shaxson (2008:5) illustrates this clearly when he reasons that “resources like oil and 
gas should be a blessing for countries that produce it. Norway and Britain seem to 
have done well out of their oilfields, but in Africa the record is different. Producing 
oil seems to be a bit like taking cocaine: if you are already healthy it might invigorate 
you, but  if you are weak or sick, as many African countries are, it can do you serious 
harm.” Similarly, Williams (2011:630) notes that, “Equatorial Guinea’s oil wealth, far 
from being a blessing to the population, has been a curse. It is central to a culture of 
corruption that has enriched only  the ruling elite and the corporations that share in the 
resource wealth.” Indeed, the devastating effect that the discovery of oil has had on 
development is summed up by Shaxson (2005:318) who notes that, “Equatorial 
Guinea has lost  ground in the UN’s Human Development Indicators since the 
mid-1990s.” 
A review of literature relating to the discovery of oil in Equatorial Guinea shows that 
a predominant suggestion is that the country is suffering from a resource curse. It 
should, however, be emphasised that it is rather a long-running governance problem 
that is responsible for the dire situation in Equatorial Guinea. Yes, undoubtedly the 
vast revenues resulting from oil extraction have entrenched neo-patrimonialism, but 
as is clear from the preceding analysis, the root of the problem was sown long ago. 
Indeed, Clarke (2010:533) argues that, “the root dilemma is found in the political 
apparatus, rather than in oil itself.” Likewise, McSherry  (2006:24) explains that, “oil 
has exacerbated already  present pathologies in Equatorial Guinea’s political 
economy.” Shaxson (2007:1123) explains that the reason for Equatorial Guinea 
suffering in the way that it  has from the newly  discovered oil is that, “the poorer and 
weaker a country  is before the oil discovery, the more likely  it  is to be harmed by it.” 
It is therefore apparent that such countries are rather suffering from a broader 
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governance curse than a ‘resource curse’ caused by the oil. Oil has merely 
accentuated the situation. In other words, it  is the entrenched ‘predatory’ neo-
patrimonialism that is to blame for Equatorial Guinea’s development woes rather than 
the discovery  of oil. Oil has merely  served to fuel an already  efficient and systemic 
neo-patrimonial regime. Consequently, Same (2008:22) emphasises that it is “critical 
to assess the policies, institutions and capacity  for the management of Equatorial 
Guinea’s oil dominated economy.” This will be accomplished through the subsequent 
examinations of various factors that emphasise the extensive governance curse 
affecting Equatorial Guinea, which in turn show that the suggested ‘resource curse’ is 
merely one element of this broader phenomenon; it is to these factors that our 
attention is now turned.
4.3.2 Fuelling neo-patrimonialism: capital flight, profligate spending and 
international complacency
A key feature of a ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regime according to Bavister-Gould 
(2011:1) is “the use of [....] power to control economic resources, accompanied by 
wide discretion in their use or distribution [and]; the failure to use such resources for 
any observable developmental purpose.” As such, Mills (2010:16) believes that the 
reason for Africa’s developmental problems is that it has not been in the interests of 
the elites in these countries to work for the public good. Instead, Smith (2008:234) 
notes that the sole purpose of a ‘predatory’ state is “endowing the political elite with 
power, wealth, and privilege.” The kleptocratic tendencies of the Nguema family 
make it clear to see that this is a central characteristic of politics in Equatorial Guinea. 
In their theory of neo-patrimonialism, Chabal and Daloz (1999) argue that there exists 
a ‘political instrumentalization of disorder’. This means that, “political actors in 
Africa seek to maximize their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty, and 
sometimes even chaos” (Chabal and Daloz 1999:xviii). The state is seen as being at 
its most effective when it is in fact at its most ineffective (in the eyes of external 
observers and those excluded from the patronage network).  In other words, Chabal 
and Daloz (1999:14) describe how “[the state is] ineffectual in that it has never been 
in the interest of African political elites to work for the proper institutionalization of 
the state apparatus. Or to put it another way, its usefulness is greatest when it is least 
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institutionalized.” Although the current system does not work towards development 
priorities or to improve the lot  of the rank-and-file, it works perfectly  well for the 
elites in control. Consequently, there is no motivation or political will to be harnessed 
by elites to change the system. In their eyes: Africa works! 
One way in which a lack of institutionalisation and ineffectualness is displayed in 
Equatorial Guinea is through the auditing (or lack of) of oil revenues. Woods 
(2004:559) notes that oil revenues and associated spending is an official state secret. 
Gary and Karl (2003:1) highlight the detrimental effect of such a practice, “without 
improving their democratic institutions and administrative capacity, it  is unlikely  that 
African oil exporters will be able to use petrodollars to fuel poverty  reduction.” Such 
an observation, however, somewhat misinterprets the reality in a ‘predatory’ neo-
patrimonial state such as Equatorial Guinea—yes, a drive toward a more transparent 
process (as will be elaborated upon later in this chapter) would be beneficial, but there 
is a complete lack of political will to do so (Center for Economic and Social Rights 
2009:1). It is not in the interests of the Nguema regime to reform; they profit 
handsomely from the system as in its current guise. Indeed, Williams (2011:632-33) 
describes how:
 In spite of an official salary of $5,000 per month from his position as minister 
 of forestry  and agriculture, Teodoro Obiang own [an] estate in Malibu,6  two 
 large homes in Cape Town [...] and a number of expensive cars, including 
 seven Ferraris, two Lamborghinis, two Maybachs, five Bentleys, two 
 Porsches, and four Rolls Royces. With other family  members possessing 
 similar portfolios and equally small salaries, it is easy  to see why  Equatorial 
 Guinea annually ranks among the most corrupt countries in the world.7
An internet search for ‘Equatorial Guinea’ produces a limitless array of newspaper 
articles and reports by NGOs relating to the extravagant spending habits of the 
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6 Purchased for $30 million in 2006... “the property is just one of many luxury homes scattered around 
the world that are owned by the younger Obiang; all have been purchased using funds siphoned from 
the state treasury or collected in bribes” (Williams, 2011: 621). 
7 Equatorial Guinea is currently ranked 163/176 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (2012) with “budget openness” classed as “scant or none”.
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Nguema regime (the president’s son Teodoro in particular).8  According to the Center 
for Economic and Social Rights (2009:1) such profligate spending is allowed to take 
place because of “misappropriate and secret diversions of billions of dollars in oil and 
gas revenues by government officials, with the collusion of foreign banks and oil 
companies.” None more so than Riggs Bank, a US bank that found itself at the centre 
of a US Senate investigation into money-laundering and corruption in 2004.
According to Global Witness (2004:55), the reason why  “Equatorial Guinea’s oil 
money  may  not be driving the country’s development [is] because much of it may not 
even be in the country.” The extent of the problem is summed up by Williams 
(2011:631-32) who notes that: 
 The total value of Riggs Bank account balances and outstanding loans held by 
 the Obiang family, the families of other senior government officials, and the 
 government of Equatorial Guinea was almost $700 million. Bank managers 
 reported that, on occasion, Equatoguinean embassy staff and others brought  
 suitcases full of cash into a bank branch to be deposited. Simply put, President  
 Obiang and those closest to him were taking in millions of dollars from the 
 sale of Equatorial Guinea’s oil and felt  no qualms about keeping the money in 
 a US bank.
A key point is made by Human Rights Watch (2009:21) who explain that, “offshore 
accounts are common among oil producers in order to receive payments in dollars, 
but, importantly, President Obiang and his close relatives maintained signatory 
authority over many of the Riggs accounts and had complete discretion over the use 
of those funds.” Indeed, Silverstein (2006) describes how, “Obiang treats Equatorial 
Guinea's national treasury like his personal checking account.” This is, of course, 
typical practice in a ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial state. The reason for this is that in a 
‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial system, “the idea of a dissociation between public office 
and the ruler’s private interests tends to become irrelevant” (Bach 2012:31). In other 
words, the elite sees state property as their own to do with as they wish: self-
enrichment will always trump  development priorities in such a state. It would seem 
that President Obiang is only too aware of the situation. In an interview with Hilsum 
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8 A particularly shocking (albeit entertaining) account is provided in Global Witness, The Secret Life of 
a Shopaholic: How an African Dictator’s Playboy son went on a Multi-Million Dollar Shopping Spree 
in the U.S., November 2009. 
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(2003) he commented: “I am the one who arranges things in this country because in 
Africa there are lots of problems of corruption. If there is corruption, diversion of 
funds, then I’m responsible. I’m 100 percent sure of all the oil revenue because the 
one who signs is me.” If he is so sure of the oil revenues, then why would he be so 
anxious to keep  them a state secret? The diversion of these revenues for personal 
enrichment is surely  the only explanation. A report by Global Witness (2009b:4) 
argues that it is the banking industry  that plays a major role in allowing corruption to 
continue. They argue that, “by accepting customers, banks are—directly or indirectly
—assisting those who are using the assets of the state to enrich themselves or brutalise 
their own people. Corruption is not just done by the dictator who has control of 
natural resource revenues. He needs a bank willing to take the money. It take two to 
tango.” It is, however, also patently clear that it does not just  take ‘two to tango’ in 
this case. Yes, it is apparent that Riggs Bank did not take due diligence seriously when 
vetting the Obiang family as account holders—a notorious Riggs Bank internal memo 
questioning where the money was coming from, jokingly answered: “Oil—Black 
Gold—Texas Tea!” (Shaxson, 2008:128). But, Global Witness’ (2009b:11) report also 
makes the important point that, “the crucial point, less well recognised, is that the 
leaders of shadow states cannot loot the national coffers without help from outside.” 
Of course oil companies may turn a blind eye in order to win concessions, but the 
international system more widely and states in particular are also complicit. 
An article in the Los Angeles Times by Silverstein (2003) reports that in response to 
the proposed US reengagement in Equatorial Guinea, “critics say the administration 
should not embrace Obiang's regime until it improves its human rights record and 
implements anticorruption reforms.” Of course, Condoleezza Rice’s now infamous 
reference to Obiang as a “good friend” of the US show that such warnings were not 
heeded (The Washington Post 2006). Such a policy move should perhaps not be seen 
as surprising, however, given Rice’s employment history as director of Chevron from 
1991 to 2001 (Goodman 2008). In turn, of course Chevron are “pleased to be working 
in the Republic of Equatorial Guinea again” (quoted in Smoltczyk 2006). As a result, 
Esteban (2009:673) argues that, “Western oil companies [are] the main corporate 
partners for the perpetuation of the Obiang regime.” The desperate need of the US 
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amongst others to secure oil sources away from the temperamental Middle Eastern 
Gulf has made Equatorial Guinea’s high-quality, sweet crude highly  desirable and has 
resulted in a former US Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea, Frank Ruddy describing 
the Bush administration as, “big cheerleaders for the government [of Equatorial 
Guinea]—and it’s an awful government” (quoted in Maass 2005). The oil boom in 
Equatorial Guinea has, according to Frynas and Paulo (2006:240), drastically 
“improved the bargaining power of Equatorial Guinea, and President Obiang.” It has 
also, as will be explored later in this chapter, allowed the Nguema regime to, quite 
literally, get away with murder. International complicity  is a huge problem in the 
perpetuation of the ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regime in Equatorial Guinea. 
International partners (including the US, World Bank and IMF) are quite aware that 
the legal-rational façade that Equatorial Guinea presents to the outside world, is just 
that: a smoke-screen. The system benefits the oil companies and their consumers and 
the banks that facilitate capital flight as much as it does the Nguema regime as the 
weakness of the Equatorial Guinean states allows them to secure preferential 
concessions and increase profits. Consequently, there is a complete lack of political 
will on their part to reform the system as well (this will be explored in greater detail in 
the later section on transparency initiatives): resulting in a vicious cycle that is 
seemingly impossible to break. 
Furthermore, as Williams (2011:647-48) notes:
!
! Within Africa, President Obiang’s stock appears to be rising. Along with 
 neighboring Gabon, Equatorial Guinea has been selected to host the African 
 Cup of Nations, the continent’s premier soccer tournament, in 2012. Finally, in 
 January 2011, within days of Hosni Mubarak’s forced removal from power in 
 Egypt, President Obiang was elected to serve as the ceremonial head of the 
 African Union, a move that left many  governments and human rights groups 
 lamenting the fact  that the AU would make such an unfortunate and inopportune 
 statement regarding its commitment to democratization.
Although outside of the continent, the appointment of Obiang to the chair of the 
African Union (AU) was controversial, it suggests that he is well-supported on the 
African continent. Indeed, it could well be said that  the support  for his appointment 
merely highlights the image of the AU as a ‘Dictator’s Club’ which only exists to 
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espouse the sovereignty  of blood-thirsty  tyrants such as Obiang and Mugabe and 
support them against foreign criticism of their regimes through its mantra of non-
interference and anti-Western rhetoric. Moreover, Human Rights Watch (2011) 
criticised the government for spending “more than US$830 million to construct a 
luxury complex for the summit outside the nation's capital, Malabo.” This is despite 
the fact that the majority  of the population live in a state of extreme poverty. This 
suggests instead that such a ‘white elephant’ construction was merely to serve the ego 
of the Nguema ‘family business’. The excessiveness of the spending is emphasised by 
Human Rights Watch (2011) who note that, “Education spending was approximately 
$200 million in 2008, the most recent year for which the figure could be calculated. 
That sum is less than one-quarter of the government's expenditures on building the 
complex to host the AU summit.” Once again this highlights the skewed priorities of 
the Obiang regime in regards to spending government revenues. The flagrant 
disregard for the needs of the population as a whole only serves to underline the 
‘predatory’ nature of the neo-patrimonial regime in Equatorial Guinea. The support 
afforded by the AU and its member states further serves as an example of the relative 
acceptance of the practice on the African continent. With such international 
complacency it is therefore unsurprising that the ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regime 
in Equatorial Guinea continues, and largely unchallenged. Even when challenges are 
made, they  are quickly suppressed by the efficient repression apparatus in place, the 
nature of which our attention is now turned to.
 
4.3.3 Oiling the repression machine: crushing the opposition and the ‘Wonga’ 
Coup of 2004
It is often thought that Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe is the world’s worst dictator 
(Maas 2008). At least that’s what the international media would have us believe. But 
Bloomfield (2007) and Maass (2008), amongst others, believe the crown lies 
elsewhere:
 But Mugabe may  not be Africa’s worst. That prize arguably goes to Teodoro 
 Obiang, the ruler of Equatorial Guinea whose life seems a parody of the 
 dictator genre. Years of violent apprenticeship  in a genocidal regime led by  a 
 crazy uncle? Check. Power grab in a coup against the murderous uncle? 
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 Check. Execution of now-deposed uncle by firing squad? Check. Proclamation 
 of self as “the liberator” of the nation? Check. Govern for decades in a way 
 that prompts human rights groups to accuse your regime of murder, torture, 
 and corruption? Check, check, and check. (Maass 2008)
Similarly, Williams (2011:621) notes that the Nguema regime’s “grip  on power has 
been secured through a heavy reliance on nepotism, the use of foreign soldiers and 
private military corporations to guard the elite and their assets, and the ruthless 
suppression of dissent.” Such behaviour is, according to Cammack (2007:600) in-
keeping with a neo-patrimonial regime as the “overarching logic is to gain and retain 
power at all costs.” This is, of course, with absolutely no regard paid to human rights. 
Shaxson (2008:38) describes how, “as Equatorial Guinea took its first faltering steps 
into the oil age, I wondered if oil would make Obiang’s brutal government behave 
better.” This of course, unfortunately, has not been the case. In fact, if anything, the oil 
money  has only served to make the brutality  worse as the repression machine is 
fuelled by  its revenues. Moreover, Clarke (2010:140) explains that, “new oil wealth 
has made the regime protective and paranoid, with plots seen everywhere and periodic 
crackdowns a regular experience.” Similarly, Human Rights Watch (2009:2) reveal 
that “billions of dollars in oil revenue have not translated into widespread economic 
benefits for the population or dramatic improvements in human rights, making 
Equatorial Guinea a classic example of an autocratic and opaque oil-rich state.” 
Furthermore, following a visit to Equatorial Guinea, the International Bar Association 
(2003:6) reported that, “torture, failure to guarantee the right to a fair trial, lack of 
freedom of expression and association, and poor prison conditions are just some 
examples of the abuses that occur with the impunity  that exists in Equatorial Guinea.” 
The true extent  of repression in Equatorial Guinea is summed up by a Human Rights 
Watch (2009:2) report as follows:
 Dating back to before the oil boom, the current regime’s efforts to control the 
 country’s political space and economic resources have fuelled a culture of fear 
 marked by repression of the opposition and military purges. The main 
 difference in recent years is that the stakes  are higher: for a corrupt and 
 nepotistic regime that has vastly profited from the oil boom, the incentives to 
 open up  the political space and become more accountable to the country’s 
 citizens are few. But with political power in Equatorial Guinea now a prize of 
 unprecedented worth, the country appears seriously unstable. 
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Perhaps the most infamous instance of repression and terror in Equatorial Guinea 
under Obiang Nguema was following the so-called ‘Wonga’ Coup of March 2004, 
masterminded by  the British, ex-SAS mercenary, Simon Mann and his South African 
comrades, including Nick du Toit  and financed by Mark Thatcher (the son of former 
British Prime Minister, Margaret), amongst others (McSherry, 2006:23). Human 
Rights Watch (2009:73) reports that, “the Equatorial Guinean government claims 
Mann and Du Toit were part of an operation intended to overthrow the government of 
Equatorial Guinea and replace President Obiang with the exiled Severo Moto.” The 
main motivation for the coup was to “get rich” (Wallace 2012). The mercenaries 
believed that in the ‘Wonga’ Coup, they  had “the perfect plot, meticulously planned, 
audacious and hugely  lucrative, the takeover, no less, of a small country  with massive 
oil riches” (Sengupta 2008). Although the plan ultimately failed, perhaps what is most 
surprising is how much of the plot was executed before Mann and his men were 
captured at Harare airport on March 7 2004 (Human Rights Watch 2009:73). Of 
course, Obiang rewarded Mugabe handsomely  for his loyalty and support in the form 
of bounty  derived from oil revenues. As Clarke (2010:533) makes clear, “this was one 
lifelong dictator kissing another, a reality about which we should not be too 
surprised.” Such support was not forthcoming from the wider international 
community  (despite obligations under international law), however, with it reported 
that Madrid, Washington and London were well aware of the plans that were afoot 
(Barnett and Bright 2004). Unsurprisingly, serious allegations of torture were levelled 
at the Nguema regime, following the arrest and detention of the coup plotters. A report 
by Human Rights Watch (2009:77) notes that: 
 Observers from the International Bar Association and Amnesty International 
 concluded that the trial was highly flawed, especially  due to serious procedural 
 failings and allegations that torture was used to extract statements. Amnesty 
 International delegates noted that during both the pretrial stage and the court  
 hearing itself there were serious procedural irregularities in the application of 
 Equatorial Guinea law and a flagrant disregard for regional and international 
 human rights law and standards.
Such a conclusion, although shocking should not come as a surprise when the 
Nguema regime in Equatorial Guinea is examined through a lens of neo-
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patrimonialism; and ‘predatory’ rule specifically. As previously mentioned, Cammack 
(2007:600) argues that the logic of neo-patrimonialism is to remain in power; no 
matter what the costs. This would therefore suggest that no methods are off-limits. 
Jackson and Rosberg (1982:1) note that, “the political “game” in most African states 
is not yet governed by regulations that effectively prevent the unsanctioned use of 
coercion and violence. Consequently, politics are more personalized and less 
restrained.” Indeed a rallying cry made by President Obiang himself highlights the 
lack of restraint he was willing to employ in punishing those who threaten his rule, 
“[...] we have to eliminate these terrorists, we have to kill them without the need of 
taking them to justice. Nobody will ask us if they are killed in the act because they 
have come with bad intentions [...] they must  be liquidated, they must be killed 
because they are the devils” (quoted in Roberts 2006:198). This is very  much a belief 
that if you live by the sword, you will die by  the sword too. One of the worst fates 
was to befall Gerhard Merz, an arms trader who was imprisoned in Black Beach 
(Playa Negra) following the coup attempt. Although the official Equatorial Guinean 
line was that he died from a very rapid onset of cerebral malaria: 
 Fellow prisoners later said Merz died in front of them, in the cell, after torture. 
 Abel Augusto said Merz enraged the interrogators. ‘When they hit him, he 
 never said a word.’ This provoked more severe battering. ‘After one beating he 
 started speaking German, which he never did before’. Dumped back in the 
 cell, he was in wretched shape. Fellow prisoners called for medical help but  
 were ignored. He collapsed, apparently from a massive heart attack [...] When 
 an autopsy was finally  done in Germany [over three months later] it was 
 found Merz had not died of malaria (Roberts 2006:199). 
The treatment of Merz although an extreme example, was not the only instance of ill-
treatment. Human Rights Watch (2009:78-79) reports that, “the confessions made by 
the detainees in Equatorial Guinea in 2004 were clearly suspect, as were several 
statements made in Zimbabwe, which Mann claims were made only following torture 
and duress.” It  is clear that President Obiang was staying true to his word. 
Furthermore, it  was not only the coup plotters who were to suffer. Roberts (2006:192) 
describes how, “reaction to the coup attempt was fierce and furious in Malabo [...] 
Many innocent people were promptly rounded up.” It is clear that Obiang was 
following Macías’ earlier example—as Decalo (1998:99) explained; the clothes of the 
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emperor may be different, but that shouldn’t fool anyone: personal dictatorship  is still 
the modus operandi. 
As previously mentioned, the vast increase in revenue provided from oil exports has 
enabled President Obiang to establish a larger, more efficient and therefore, brutal 
security apparatus to deal with any opposition. Additionally, the discovery of oil has 
affected another aspect of human rights abuse in Equatorial Guinea: international 
condemnation (or rather the lack of). Indeed, in his book My Life for My People, 
Obiang comments that: “I have realized that the discovery of oil in Equatorial Guinea 
and especially the importance of these resources has completely changed the attitude 
of many of our partners, especially those who were more critical. Suddenly they have 
become more permissive” (quoted in Human Rights Watch 2009:87). Furthermore, 
Esteban (2009:673) explains that the vast oil revenues “release the state from popular 
pressure on political accountability and have been used to reinforce Obiang’s grip  on 
power through patronage, co-optation and repression.” Taylor (2010:138) notes that  in 
2003 the US reopened its embassy  in Equatorial Guinea without any improvement in 
human rights treatment from when they closed it eight years earlier. Esteban 
(2009:679), however, explains how: 
 In countries like the United States and Spain, making diplomatic concessions 
 to and  engaging in business with such a repressive and corrupt regime as that 
 headed by Obiang badly affect the popularity of the authorities. This greatly 
 reduces the scope for bilateral co-operation and explains the low profile given 
 by the Bush and Zapatero administrations to their relationships with Malabo. 
 For example, when President  Bush had breakfast with Obiang in 2002 the 
 While House refused to release any photograph of the meeting. Contrary to 
 normal practices at this kind of event, the US Department of State made no 
 official comments on the reopening of the US embassy  in Malabo in order to 
 avoid any focus on the issue.
 
In contrast, Esteban (2009:669) observes that, “the Chinese government is more 
supportive of the Obiang regime [...] than its Western counterparts, since Chinese 
authorities are not hostile to this kind of political regime and do not suffer pressure 
from domestic civil society on this issue.” Regardless of this, Ross (2008:8) warns 
that it may not all be plain-sailing for Chinese oil companies in Equatorial Guinea 
because, as was seen in the Sudan, “pressure could work against these companies, as 
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many of them are publicly listed [...] the Dutch pension fund PGGM withdrew its $54 
million investment in Chinese oil company PetroChina to protest the operations of 
PetroChina’s parent company  in Sudan.” Such a move suggests a push towards 
transparency and improved human rights standards; a factor that will be examined in 
the following section as the future prospects of the Nguema regime in Equatorial 
Guinea is considered.
4.3.4 Looking to the future: the drive for transparency and the prospects for 
regime survival
As explained in the earlier discussion of the ‘resource curse’, Equatorial Guinea is 
currently suffering from an extreme governance curse. Gary and Karl (2003:1) 
observe that that at present oil revenues are captured by a government that lacks 
accountability. Consequently, these revenues are spent at the will of the Nguema 
regime rather than in a way that benefits the populace as a whole. Such practice is in-
keeping with a system of neo-patrimonialism. Bratton and van de Walle (1997:62) 
explain how, “officials occupy bureaucratic positions less to perform public service, 
their ostensible purpose, than to acquire personal wealth and status.” Furthermore, a 
‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regime exists when neo-patrimonialism “permeates the 
entire state” (Bach 2012:31) because “personal rule and control of resources reach a 
paroxysmic level [...] the idea of a dissociation between public office and the ruler’s 
private interests tends to become irrelevant” (Bach 2012:30). According to Gary and 
Karl (2003:1) and Ross (2008:6), an option for reversing such a situation is to 
improve transparency. 
A Global Witness (2004:5) report  into transparency observes that, “the international 
community  has taken its first steps towards recognising the importance of improved 
transparency and accountability of natural resource revenues.” Furthermore, Puppim 
de Oliveira and Ali (2006:11) note that the Riggs Bank scandal and the resultant US 
Senate investigation is the first step (of many required) toward acknowledging the 
need for increased transparency, accountability and responsibility. One of the most 
well-known initiatives to have been (briefly) explored by the Equatorial Guinea 
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government was the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). According to 
the EITI website (n.d.):
 The EITI is a global standard that promotes revenue transparency and 
 accountability in the extractive sector. It has a robust yet flexible methodology 
 for monitoring and reconciling company  payments and government revenues 
 from oil, gas and mining at the country level.
In other words, it is “designed to reduce the theft of revenues from the production of 
oil, gas, and other natural resources by establishing uniform accounting standards and 
a mechanism for monitoring production company payment and government 
receipts” (Williams 2011:639). Ross (2008:6) argues that the EITI needs to go even 
further. This is because, “even though exporting governments are pressured to 
disclose the revenues they collect, they are not expected to reveal how they spend the 
money. Oil revenues often vanish into the nooks of state-owned oil companies or into 
governments’ off-budget accounts.” As a result, he suggests that the “EITI (or similar 
effort) [...] develop guidelines for the transparent allocation of all revenues from 
extractive industries” (Ross 2008:6). Equatorial Guinea joined the EITI as a candidate 
country  on 27 September 2007 (EITI n.d.). Yates (2012:63), however, notes that as a 
“corrupt autocrat”, Equatorial Guinea’s “participation in EITI should be considered 
more as a diplomatic gesture toward foreign investors than a real commitment to 
revenue transparency.” Indeed, the voluntary  nature of the EITI meant that the 
Equatorial Guinean government did not meet their deadline for completing EITI 
validation (EITI n.d.) and in April 2010, the request for an extension was refused 
(EITI 2010). Consequently, Human Rights Watch (2009:3) observe that “there is a 
serious policy disconnect between the official rhetoric and the reality  on the ground in 
Equatorial Guinea.” The major failure of transparency  initiatives such as EITI is that 
it is a voluntary process. According to Global Witness (2004:6) “this voluntary 
approach will not work in the majority of countries where it is most needed. [...] 
Massive financial improprieties [...] show that political and business elites currently 
have a vested interest in avoiding transparency.” Of course this is the central argument 
of Chabal and Daloz’s (1999) theory focusing on the ‘political instrumentalization of 
disorder’: profiting from the disordered nature of the state. After all, it is considerably 
easier to loot the state coffers if they are in a state of disarray. Consequently, it is not 
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in the interests of the elites to reform this system, which in its current chaotic guise 
serves them so well. It  is also important to remember a key observation made by 
Chabal and Daloz (1999:xix) that:
 To speak of disorder is not, of course, to speak of irrationality. It is merely to 
 make explicit  the observation that political action operates rationally, but 
 largely in the realm of the informal, uncodified and unpoliced—that is, in a 
 world that is not ordered in the sense in which we usually take our own 
 polities in the West to be.
In a political arena where power is seen as being zero-sum and utilising state 
resources for self-enrichment as the primary goal it makes no sense to employ 
transparency initiatives to reform a system that currently works so well (as it is so 
profitable) for a member of the elite. 
It is not just the corrupt regimes themselves that show a lack of commitment to 
transparency initiatives, but also their business partners; whether they be oil 
companies who provide the revenues, or banks who help  stow them. A lack of 
transparency currently  makes more business sense to them too. As the aforementioned 
Riggs Bank scandal showed, banks are not committed to employing due diligence 
measures when vetting potential customers. Indeed, a report by  Global Witness 
(2009b:2) notes that, “while it is important that banks develop their own effective 
know-your-customer policies, [...] leaving banks to do it on their own without 
regulatory oversight will not work, because the avoidance of corrupt funds inevitably 
involves turning down potential business, and not all banks are willing to do this.” 
Furthermore, Global Witness (2009b:6) also advises that, “those governments that 
have committed themselves to making poverty history, and that claim to be pushing 
good governance and accountability through their aid interventions, are guilty of 
hypocrisy if they fail to take responsibility for how their financial institutions and the 
financial systems which they regulate are contributing to corruption and therefore 
poverty.” As the above discussion of human rights shows, however, rhetoric and 
reality  in the case of Western governments dealings with regimes such as Equatorial 
Guinea are two very different things.
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Industry competition and an overarching concern for profits is the main reason for oil 
companies failing to commit to initiatives that  establish a culture of transparency. 
Human Rights Watch (2009:39) explains that the:
 Contracts for two of the largest oil concessions in Equatorial Guinea, the Alba 
 and Zafiro fields, were negotiated in 1990 and 1992 respectively, without  
 outside consultation from the World Bank. The contracts were extremely 
 favorable to the oil companies, both because of the actual financial terms of 
 the agreement and because the government, given its limited institutional 
 capacity, had trouble monitoring the complicated financial transactions 
 required by the terms of the contract.
As it stands, “oil companies keep 80 per cent of oil revenues, and the government 
only 20 per cent. This is up from the original 13 per cent share that was renegotiated 
with World Bank assistance in 1998. It is also one of the world’s most attractive deals; 
regionally, it  is only surpassed by the even lower country  take of Chad” (Soares de 
Oliveira 2007:232). Indeed, Human Rights Watch (2009:39) notes that, “the 
[Equatorial Guinean] government would later claim to find $88 million in payment 
discrepancies from companies, including ExxonMobil, between 1996 and 2001.” 
Whilst a key explanation for the poor contract terms negotiated by the Equatorial 
Guinean government is the simple desire to get rich, quick, there is a further issue that 
is a direct result of the dominant neo-patrimonial system. As a result  of the 
misappropriation of public funds that should have been invested in education, there is 
a lack of a skilled workforce. Consequently, Soares de Oliveira (2007:232) observes, 
“there is the lack of local capacity  in technical and regulatory terms. Technical 
dependence means that the country is utterly reliant on company expertise even for 
comparatively  simple tasks. [...] It  also means that companies can hold information 
about the oil sector that is very  difficult for the government to acquire on its own. 
Moreover, regulatory  insufficiencies result in company  operations not being carefully 
audited, which expands opportunities for creative accountancy.” Therefore, the 
profitability of the oil sector is significantly  hampered by  the ‘predatory’ neo-
patrimonial regime in place. Until greater transparency is employed in all aspects of 
the Equatorial Guinean political and economic spheres and the extreme governance 
curse tackled, it  will remain the case that, “the benefits of development remain 
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concentrated in the hands of a very small elite, [...] with very  few trickle-down effects 
for the masses.” A significant increase in political will is needed from the Equatorial 
Guinean government, oil companies, partner countries , the banking industry and 
International Financial Institutions, amongst others, for the ‘lot’ of the ordinary 
Equatorial Guinean to improve; this sadly, is severely lacking.
4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter set out to trace the entrenchment of neo-patrimonialism in Equatorial 
Guinea under the presidency of Obiang Nguema (1979-present). Whilst initially there 
was great hope that Obiang really  was the ‘liberator’ of the Equatorial Guinean 
people, as Decalo (1998:103) observed, it  is not possible to provide a “postmortem of 
dictatorship” in the case of Equatorial Guinea. Even if Equatorial Guinea under 
Obiang could be said to have “turned over a new leaf, it is still on the same branch as 
the old. Obiang retains the final word” (Fegley 1989:231). From the investigation of 
political and economic realities in Equatorial Guinea since the discovery of oil in the 
mid-1990s it is very  much apparent that President Obiang Nguema and the kinsmen 
and cronies who compose his patronage network have entrenched a ‘predatory’ neo-
patrimonial regime. Such a regime is characterised by a complete lack of 
“dissociation between public office and the ruler’s private interests” (Bach 2012:31). 
Silverstein (2006) illustrates this point well when he describes how, “Obiang treats 
Equatorial Guinea's national treasury like his personal checking account.” 
Consequently, the underdeveloped nature of the Equatorial Guinean state, represented 
by the monumental gap between GDP per capita figures and the countries low 
position in the UNDP Human Development Index is the sole responsibility of the 
Nguema regime. This is because development policies which benefit the populace as 
a whole, are not  in keeping with the financial self-interest of those in power (Mills 
2010:16).  
Since the discovery  of oil Equatorial Guinea has been widely  considered to be 
suffering from a ‘resource curse’ as the vast revenues accrued through oil export have 
not served to improve the everyday  lives of the ordinary  citizens; in fact if anything, 
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their ‘lot’ has worsened. It is, however, apparent from the in-depth study of Equatorial 
Guinea produced thus far that as argued by Clarke (2010), oil itself is not the problem. 
It is in fact a broader governance curse that Equatorial Guinea is suffering from—oil 
has only fuelled the existing problem. This argument is supported by McSherry 
(2006:24) who insists that, “oil has exacerbated already present pathologies in 
Equatorial Guinea’s political economy, paving the way for a future of 
underdevelopment, instability and authoritarian rule.” As is apparent from the 
preceding chapter on the rule of Macías Nguema (1968-1979) neo-patrimonialism 
was already  a significant issue in Equatorial Guinea and it has just become further 
entrenched and unrestrained under the rule of Obiang Nguema. This is particularly 
apparent through the extravagant spending habits displayed by members of the 
regime, most notably his son and widely expected successor, Teodorín. 
This chapter has also highlighted the central role that  external actors play  in 
perpetuating the system of neo-patrimonialism in Equatorial Guinea. It is clear that 
good governance rhetoric propounded by Western states becomes rather hollow when 
considered in light of their continued partnership with the regime in order to secure 
access to oil. This is particularly apparent in the case of the US. Their need to find an 
alternative source of oil to the increasingly temperamental Middle East, means that 
they  are prepared to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses. This is clearly evident in 
the US decision to reopen their embassy in Malabo in 2003, despite no improvement 
being seen in conditions there (Taylor 2010:138). Moreover, voluntary  transparency 
initiatives are significantly  undermined by the lack of commitment by  oil companies 
and banks to shed light on money paid to the Equatorial Guinean government for oil 
or the subsequent storing of these funds; enabling capital flight. The lack of 
accountability displayed enables the continuance of corrupt practices by a ‘predatory’ 
neo-patrimonial regime, such as that of Obiang Nguema. Until there is greater 
condemnation of the (illegal) practices of the Nguema regime, there can be little hope 
for improvements in development indicators in Equatorial Guinea. In GDP per capita 
terms and oil company literature, Equatorial Guinea may now be ‘the Kuwait of 
Africa’, but for the ordinary citizen the reality is more akin to a diplomat’s verdict that 
it is in fact “a festering pustule in the armpit of Africa” (quoted in Shaxson 2008:29).
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In the past few years, Equatorial Guinea, population 500,000, has become the third-
largest oil exporter in sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria and Angola. Per capita, it is 
one of the richest countries on the continent; rated by how much money ends up in the 
pockets of people not related to the president, it remains one of the poorest.
Peter Maas, A Touch of Crude, 2005.
5.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
This study has been concerned with finding an explanation for the situation described 
in Maas’ quotation. Why is it that the World Bank’s 2013 World Development 
Indicators (WDI) found that countries with the highest levels of extreme poverty also 
tend to be amongst the richest in terms of natural resource reserves (Guigale 2013)? 
Why is it that Equatorial Guinea boasts the highest GDP per capita on the African 
continent  according to the World Bank (2013); yet, it  languishes at 136 out of a total 
of 187 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index (2013)? The aim of this 
thesis has been to highlight the dire situation that is currently experienced by the 
ordinary  people of Equatorial Guinea. Whilst the president and his family may be able 
to spend millions of US dollars on real estate and supercars, 70% of his people 
struggle to get  by  on less than $2 a day  (Europa 2012:1673). The reason for this vast 
disparity in wealth and resultant inequality is attributable to the neo-patrimonial 
regime that is entrenched in Equatorial Guinea. The commonly-held belief of the few 
that have heard of this small state in ‘the armpit’ of West Africa is that it is suffering 
from a ‘resource curse’—struggling to deal with its new-found, unprecedented level 
of wealth. Instead, this thesis has argued that it is rather a governance curse that 
Equatorial Guinea is being decimated by  and that oil has in fact only exacerbated 
existing pathologies in its political economy (McSherry 2006:24). This has been 
achieved by tracing the introduction and normalisation of a system of neo-
patrimonialism in Equatorial Guinea. It has shown that the flawed nature of the 
90
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
political system was already in evidence prior to independence being granted in 1968, 
developed under the crazed dictatorship of Macías Nguema (1968-1979) and became 
entrenched under the excesses of the “worst dictator in Africa” (Maas 2008); Obiang 
Nguema (1979-present) to the extent that  neo-patrimonialism is now, clearly  the 
modus operandi of politics in Equatorial Guinea. This chapter will now trace the 
development of the thesis and summarise its findings in order to highlight the answers 
to the research questions and hypothesis articulated in chapter one. Finally, it will 
provide recommendations on future research and potential further studies; in an 
attempt to predict what may lie ahead for Equatorial Guinea.
5.2 THE PROGRESS AND FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
With the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2013) acting as a springboard 
to the study, the following research question was formulated as an attempt to provide 
an understanding of the situation in Equatorial Guinea: How did neo-patrimonialism 
take hold in Equatorial Guinea and how does this system explain the desperate state of 
the country today? 
In order to answer this question, it was first  necessary to provide a detailed definition 
of the theory of neo-patrimonialism. This was conceptualised through an extensive 
literature review in chapter two, before a theoretical framework was introduced that 
could then be applied in the subsequent chapters in order to provide a rigorous 
analysis of the situation that Equatorial Guinea is in today and how this state 
developed over time; from its roots in the Spanish colonial administration. The 
theoretical framework adopted was comprised of two elements: (i) the theory of 
‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regimes (Bach 2012; Bavister-Gould 2011) and; (ii) the 
theory  of the ‘political instrumentalization of disorder’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999). 
These two theories were chosen as they provided the greatest  potential for the analysis 
of the regime in Equatorial Guinea. The central aspect of a ‘predatory’ neo-
patrimonial regime is that “personal rule and control of resources reach a paroxysmic 
level. [... And therefore] the idea of a dissociation between public office and the 
ruler’s private interests tends to become irrelevant” (Bach 2012:30-31). In essence, 
this theoretical framework can be used to explain what is happening in Equatorial 
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Guinea. It  also serves to classify when a ‘predatory’ level of neo-patrimonialism has 
been achieved (see Bavister-Gould 2011:1-2 list of characteristics in chapter two). 
This is vital according to Bach (2012:29) as he believes that neo-patrimonialism is 
seen in two forms: ‘regulated’ and ‘predatory’. Whilst not an ideal form, the fact that 
“regulated neopatrimonialism is capped and ringfenced” may  make it the lesser of two 
evils. A differentiation between the two forms is therefore desirable. From using 
Bach’s (2012) and Bavister-Gould’s (2011) theoretical framework to establish an idea 
of what is taking place in Equatorial Guinea, Chabal and Daloz’s (1999) theory of the 
‘the instrumentalization of disorder’ can be employed to explain why it has become 
entrenched and endured for so long. In summary, it is because it  works in the eyes of 
the elites. The state is at its most effective for them when it is at its most ineffective in 
the eyes of the outside world (Chabal and Daloz 1999:14). In other words, “its 
usefulness is greatest when it is least institutionalized” (Chabal and Daloz 1999:14). 
Such a state of affairs, explains why the ruling elites in states such as Equatorial 
Guinea show little desire to work to reform the system. Chabal and Daloz (1999:104) 
note that “such a state of affairs may not be desirable in the long term for the country 
as a whole [... But] it remains both entirely  coherent and eminently  reasonable for 
those Africans who can manage to benefit from the system as it works.” A final, key 
observation of Chabal and Daloz (1999:xix) is that whilst the system in states such as 
Equatorial Guinea may be disordered it  is not irrational—“political action operates 
rationally, but largely in the realm of the informal, uncodified and unpoliced—that is 
in a world not  ordered in the sense in which we usually  take our own polities in the 
West to be.” In fact, the neo-patrimonial system in Equatorial Guinea is an intentional 
rejection of the Western system. Such a theoretical framework is essential in order to 
understand the endurance of the Nguema regime in Equatorial Guinea. Why would 
they  want to change a system which works so well for them, and from which they 
profit so handsomely?
The remainder of the thesis was focused on the application of this combined 
theoretical framework through a chronological exploration of the development of the 
Nguema regime and the resultant  explanation of how neo-patrimonialism developed, 
became normalised and consequently  entrenched over time. Chapter three began by 
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tracing the roots of neo-patrimonialism which were sown by the Spanish colonial 
administration. The different levels of colonisation experienced and development 
enacted meant that upon being granted independence in 1968, Equatorial Guinea was 
not a unified state and as a result it was easy for Macías Nguema to practice a policy 
of divide-and-rule in order to secure his presidency and eliminate opposition 
elements. It was this section that answered the first sub-research question posed: How 
did the Spanish colonial legacy provide the conditions for neo-patrimonialism to 
develop in Equatorial Guinea? The favouring of the island-based clans of the 
Fernandino and Bubi by the Spanish, created an inferiority complex in Macías that 
was to have a devastating effect. It planted the seed for his regime to be based on 
avenging his oppressors. Regarded by  Maas (2005) as a hybrid of Pol Pot and Idi 
Amin, Macías’ regime can be summed up as “one of the 20th century’s most brutal 
genocides” yet  tragically, for its people “no foreign power except for Equatorial 
Guinea’s former colonial ruler paid attention to it, and the fascist regime of Spain’s 
Francisco Franco was not overly troubled by human rights abuses.” The madness of 
Macías resulted in Equatorial Guinea being regarded as one of the most tragic failures 
of newly-independent Africa. His rule rivalled only Bokassa in the Central African 
Republic and Idi Amin in Uganda. Overall, this chapter provided a detailed insight 
into how neo-patrimonialism began to develop in Equatorial Guinea and how Macías 
rule was an archetypal example of both Bach’s (2012) and Bavister-Gould’s (2011) 
theory of a ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial regime.
Finally, chapter four focused upon Macías’ successor, Obiang Nguema, who 
overthrew his uncle in a military coup d’état in August  1979. In power ever since, 
Obiang has (since the fall of Gaddafi) become the longest-serving African president; 
and according to Bloomfield (2007) amongst others, one of the continent’s worst 
despots (even worse than Mugabe, if Maas (2008) is to be believed). Indeed, Maas 
(2008) notes that although Macías was a tough act to follow (having liquidated 
approximately one-third of the population during his eleven years in power), Obiang’s 
could be seen as the “Switzerland of dictatorships—so effective at enforcing 
obedience that the spectacle of unrest  is invisible.” This is not the only link between 
Equatorial Guinea and Switzerland that can be made when analysing Obiang’s tenure. 
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Indeed, it is widely-thought that millions of the country’s vast oil revenues are stashed 
off-shore in Swiss bank accounts (after the regime was forced to empty their US-
based Riggs Bank account following a US Senate investigation into money laundering 
and capital flight). The excessive and flagrant  spending of the Obiang regime, in 
particular his playboy son (and widely-touted successor), Teodoro serves as a prime 
example (coupled with the extreme human rights abuses, obsession with the cult  of 
personality and constitutional adaptation) of how Nguema has entrenched neo-
patrimonialism in Equatorial Guinea to the extent that it has become the modus 
operandi for all state activities and to a large extent  makes it a unique example of neo-
patrimonialism in Africa (the answer to the second sub-research question).
So where does the money come from that sustains this ‘predatory’ neo-patrimonial 
regime? “Oil—Black Gold—Texas Tea!” (Shaxson 2008:128). The latter half of 
chapter four examines the discovery of oil in Equatorial Guinea in the mid-1990s and 
how the resultant vast revenues have greased the neo-patrimonial machine already in 
place. Rejecting the dominant argument proposed that Equatorial Guinea suffers from 
a ‘resource curse’, this section argues that in fact it  is a broader governance curse that 
is engulfing the country.  As Clarke (2010:533) argues, “the root dilemma is found in 
the political apparatus, rather than in oil itself.” Therefore, although oil can be blamed 
for sustaining the dire state of affairs in Equatorial Guinea, it is not  to blame for their 
existence. As the previous sections illustrated, the neo-patrimonial regime was already 
entrenched before the discovery  of oil. Its extraction has merely  afforded the Nguema 
regime even greater revenues to service their patronage networks with and sustained 
and funded self-enrichment to the extent that the personal and legal-rational are 
indivisible, with a state of ‘L’État c’est moi’ being displayed—the answer to the final 
sub-research question. To focus on the situation in Equatorial Guinea as evidence of a 
‘resource curse’ is erroneous. The problems afflicting the country  have existed for 
much longer than the US has been extracting oil for. Yet, it is only the discovery of oil 
that can really be thanked for bringing Equatorial Guinea to the attention of the world. 
As Maas (2005) wryly notes, “if America’s interest in foreign countries were 
predicated on human rights, Equatorial Guinea would have seized our attention long 
before its 1995 oil boom.” Yet, tragically it  is not human rights that  determines US (or 
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any of Equatorial Guinea’s other partner countries for that matter) foreign policy; but 
rather their thirst  for oil. Such a fact also accounts for why such a sorry state of affairs 
will endure in Equatorial Guinea for the foreseeable future; at least until the oil 
reserves are bled dry; or the state coffers by the Nguema regime, depending on which 
happens first!
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION
As the limitations outlined in the introduction to this thesis made clear, due to the 
closed and repressive nature of the Nguema regime, the chances of undertaking 
primary research in Equatorial Guinea are extremely restricted. The secrecy 
surrounding the regime and the efficient terror network in place mean that fieldwork 
is likely to be cut short if the researcher is even allowed into the country. 
Consequently, future research is likely to need to be based on the examination of 
existing sources and statistics, as this study has been. If anything, it could be argued 
that due to the secretive nature of the Nguema regime and the resultant lack of 
attention that has been paid to this small state in ‘the armpit’ of West Africa warrants 
the necessity for further research being carried out to raise its profile and increase 
interest in it; only then can there be any hope of a change in regime being enacted.
A future study  of a comparative nature could be conducted examining Equatorial 
Guinea in comparison to another oil rich state which has made a success of its oil 
wealth. Whilst the temptation may  be to choose a state such as Norway, which is 
arguably the most successful examples of a state using its oil wealth for the 
betterment of the nation as a whole, it may well be more beneficial to use a state in 
the Middle-Eastern Gulf, for instance Kuwait. This is because Kuwait, like Equatorial 
Guinea is classed as a patrimonial state and does not fit with the Western liberal 
democratic ideal. Furthermore, a number of recent scholarly articles on Equatorial 
Guinea since the discovery  of oil, have given it the moniker ‘the Kuwait of Africa’; it 
would therefore be interesting and beneficial to investigate the similarities and 
differences between these two states. The vast wealth that the Kuwaiti state accrued 
through the total ownership of the oil industry, has enabled it to develop  one of the 
richest patronage networks in the world along with the most comprehensive welfare 
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system. Through such provisions it  has been possible for the ruling family in Kuwait 
to both reward supporters and most importantly pay-off opponents. Moreover, the 
welfare system in Kuwait is credited with substantially  reducing the basis for social 
and economic unrest. As a result of the high rents accumulated from oil production it 
is unnecessary to tax the citizens and therefore the regime is not only  able to stem 
opposition by providing education, healthcare, property  and heavily  subsidised energy 
commodities, but also by  not taxing their citizens, the Kuwaiti regime is freer from 
accountability for their actions, most notably  a lack of democratic practices. Whilst 
the political situation in Kuwait is in no way ideal by Western democratic standards, it 
does perhaps occupy a middle ground that the Nguema regime in Equatorial Guinea 
could be encouraged to adopt. Although, as Chabal and Daloz’s (1999) theory of the 
‘political instrumentalization of disorder’ makes clear, such a move seems unlikely, as 
the current system serves their self-enrichment purpose so well.
An additional element for investigation and one which was touched upon in chapter 
four (space constraints inhibited further attention) is the role of external factors in 
contributing to and helping to sustain the ‘predatory‘ neo-patrimonial regime in 
Equatorial Guinea. A deeper investigation into international complacency and the 
aiding and abetting of the Nguema regime by those who have a stake in and profit 
from the state as it is now (for instance, oil companies, the US, China and the 
international banking industry) would be beneficial. There is a tendency  to point the 
finger at Equatorial Guinea and declare it ‘the worst country in the world’ etc., but as 
the brief section in chapter four highlighted, it  takes two (if not more) to tango and 
Western critics in particular, perhaps need to look closer to home for the answer as to 
why Equatorial Guinea remains such an extreme example of a neo-patrimonial 
regime. Of course, the role of power politics, the anarchic international system (which 
makes enforceable transparency initiatives and regulatory  frameworks more difficult 
to introduce), China’s disregard for human rights and the dominant neo-liberal order 
dominated by the US thirst for oil are likely to hamper such efforts.
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5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The central focus of this study has been to explore and explain how neo-
patrimonialism has developed and become entrenched in Equatorial Guinea to the 
extent that such a system of governance has become the modus operandi. The study 
has shown why a theoretical framework grounded in neo-patrimonialism is the central 
explanation for how politics plays out in Equatorial Guinea and that such a system has 
created a governance curse which has enveloped the state, rather than the more-
commonly touted ‘resource curse’. As a consequence of completing this research it is 
possible to accept the following hypothesis, which was articulated in the introductory 
chapter: A political culture of neo-patrimonialism has been developed and become 
entrenched in Equatorial Guinea to the extent  that it  is now the modus operandi and is 
responsible for the underdevelopment of the country that has been observed since 
gaining independence from Spain in 1968. Although the discovery of vast oil reserves 
in the 1990s has resulted in vast  wealth being accrued, this prosperity  has only  been 
captured by the small elite that characterises the system of neo-patrimonialism: as a 
result, vast wealth disparity exists. Neo-patrimonialism, therefore, is the key 
explanation for the extreme discrepancy between Equatorial Guinea’s GDP per capita 
income—32 (World Bank 2011) —and its ranking on the UNDP HDI—136 out of 
187 countries (UNDP 2013)—a difference of 104; making it one of the most unequal 
societies in the world. As such, those heralding Equatorial Guinea as the ‘Kuwait of 
Africa’ are misguided; it is still the sweaty, armpit of Africa that it always has been: 
and such is the nature of the Nguema regime that it looks to remain so for the 
foreseeable future.
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